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ARTICLE

THE VALUE OF THE RIGHT TO EXCLUDE:
AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT

JONATHAN KLICK† & GIDEON PARCHOMOVSKY††
Property theorists have long deemed the right to exclude as fundamental and
essential for the efficient use and allocation of property. Recently, however, proponents
of the progressive property movement have called into question the centrality of the
right to exclude, suggesting that it should be scaled back to allow the advancement of
more socially beneficial uses of property. Surprisingly, the debate between the proponents
and detractors of the right to exclude is devoid of any empirical evidence. The actual
value of the right to exclude remains unknown.
In this Article, we set out to fill this void by measuring, for the first time, the
value of the right to exclude. To that end, we use the passage of the Countryside and
Rights of Way Act of England and Wales in 2000 as a natural experiment to provide
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empirical insight into this issue. We show that the Act’s passage led to statistically
significant and substantively large declines in property values in areas of England
and Wales that were more intensively affected by the Act relative to areas where less
land was designated for increased access. While property prices might not capture all
social value, our findings provide a critical input to the debate regarding access to private
property. Given that the access rights provided by the “right to roam” included in the Act
represent seemingly minimal intrusions on private property, our findings indicate that
property owners view even small restrictions on their right to exclude very negatively.
We believe that our findings are of significant importance to lawmakers in the
United States, as they provide an empirical basis for policymaking in the realms of
property and land use. In the United States, private property rights enjoy constitutional
protection under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Hence, any attempt to
formalize a general right to roam or other intrusions on the right to exclude may require
the government to pay just compensation to affected property owners. Our study suggests
what the just compensation amounts are likely to be. This information would allow
lawmakers to make better decisions about the social desirability of various land use
measures. We would like to emphasize that our findings should not be read as a call
against the adoption of a right to roam or any other public privilege. Our only goal is
to furnish a needed empirical foundation that would permit lawmakers to conduct a
more precise cost–benefit analysis of different policies.
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INTRODUCTION
In one of the most famous sentences in the history of property law,
William Blackstone described property as “that sole and despotic dominion
which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in
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total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe.”1 Importantly,
in this statement, Blackstone did not advance an original conception of
property. Nor was it a normative statement. Rather, Blackstone’s comment was
descriptive. It accurately reflected the property conception that prevailed at
his time.
Although Blackstone’s view is often ridiculed by contemporary property
scholars for being too extreme, when he originally offered it, there was nothing
remarkable about it; it was neither radical nor revolutionary. In fact, the root
of the property conception that puts the right to exclude at its core goes back
to Roman law. Roman property law was organized around the principle of a
single owner with a full dominion over an asset or a resource.2 Furthermore,
as Yun-chien Chang and Henry Smith observe in their comparative study of
civil and common law property, even though the two legal systems grew out
of very different traditions and use different property concepts,
ownership under the civil law and fee simple ownership of land in the
common law system (and for the most part the respective notions of full
ownership of personal property) coincide to a remarkable extent in their basic
features: a possessory right to prevent invasions subject to qualifications such
as for necessity, and supplemented by duties (for example, for lateral support
or to shovel sidewalks).3

In the 1920s and 1930s, the primacy of the right to exclude to the
understanding of property was challenged by the rise of the legal realism
movement that endorsed and popularized the conception of property as a
malleable “bundle-of-rights.”4 The realists advocated a non-monolithic,
highly contextual and relational view of property and, chiefly, inveighed
against the claim that property has any definitive conceptual characteristics.
Yet, even notable legal realists such as Felix Cohen conceded that the right to
exclude is indispensable to all property relationships.5 Similarly, the Oxford
1 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2.
2 See Juan Javier Del Granado, The Genius of Roman Law from a Law and Economics Perspective,
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 301, 316 (2011) (“Roman property law typically gives a single property

13
holder a bundle of rights with respect to everything in his domain, to the exclusion of the rest of
the world.”).
3 Yun-chien Chang & Henry E. Smith, An Economic Analysis of Civil Versus Common Law
Property, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2012).
4 For a detailed discussion of the bundle-of-rights metaphor and its intellectual roots, see Jane
B. Baron, Rescuing the Bundle-of-Rights Metaphor in Property Law, 82 U. CIN. L. REV. 57, 62-67 (2013).
For a powerful criticism of the bundle-of-rights conception, see Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E.
Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 397-98 (2001), which
concludes that the bundle-of-rights conception ignores the in rem dimension of property rights.
5 See Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 357, 370-71 (1954)
(stating that although the concept of private property may or may not involve the rights to use and
sell the property, it indisputably involves a right to exclude others from doing something).
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philosopher A.M. Honoré, who may have developed the definitive account
of the “property bundle” by enumerating as many as eleven incidents that
come under the definition of the term ownership,6 is understood to have
privileged the right to exclude.7
More importantly, the Supreme Court, while adopting the bundle of
rights conception, has emphasized the centrality of the right to exclude in its
rulings. For example, in Kaiser Aetna v. United States, the Supreme Court
stated that the owner’s right to exclude others from her land is “one of the
most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized
as property.”8
It is important to note at this point that the “bundle of rights” conception
was not universally accepted. Many legal scholars9 and philosophers10 rejected
it and, instead, steadfastly adhered to the traditional view that positioned
exclusion at the center of our property system. Economists, too, have treated
the right to exclude as the keystone right, explaining that it is essential to the
efficient use of resources11 and to the successful functioning of markets and
the economy.12
Recently, the right to exclude has come under another scholarly attack due
to the rise of the “progressive property movement.” Pioneered by Gregory
Alexander, Eduardo Peñalver, Joseph Singer, and Laura Underkuffler, and
joined by many other prominent scholars, the progressive property movement
6 See A.M. Honoré, Ownership (describing the necessary ingredients in ownership, or, in other
words, the bundle of rights that accompany property ownership), in THE NATURE AND PROCESS
OF LAW 370, 370-75 (Patricia Smith ed., 1993).
7 See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Information Asymmetries and the Rights to Exclude, 104 MICH. L.
REV. 1835, 1836 n.3 (2006) (suggesting that Honoré believed that “humans are hardwired to want to
exclude others from their property”).
8 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979).
9 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 754 (1998)
(“[P]roperty means the right to exclude others from valued resources, no more and no less.”); cf.
Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Demystifying the Right to Exclude: Of Property, Inviolability and Automatic
Injunctions, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 593, 600 (2008) (emphasizing that, to be meaningful, the
idea of property “must contain, at a minimum, some element of exclusion,” but noting that the
objective of the article “is not to argue that the right to exclude is all that there is in property”).
10 See, e.g., J.W. HARRIS, PROPERTY AND JUSTICE 13 (2003) (arguing that property should be
conceived of as comprising items that are the “subject of direct trespassory protection”); J.E.
PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 68 (1997) (asserting that property rights can be entirely
explained using the concepts of exclusion and use).
11 See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 356 (1967)
(noting that an owner, by virtue of his power to exclude others, has “incentives to utilize resources
more efficiently”).
12 See RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 48 (4th ed. 1984) (“The market can function only in a situation where the ‘exclusion
principle’ applies, i.e., where A’s consumption is made contingent on A’s paying the price, while B,
who does not pay, is excluded. Exchange cannot occur without property rights, and property rights
require exclusion. Given such exclusion, the market can function as an auction system.”).
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presents a pluralistic view of property designed to accommodate and promote
a myriad of incommensurable values.13 While the view advanced by progressive
property scholars has much in common with the writings of the legal realists of
the 1920s and 1930s, there are important differences between the two
movements. The focus of legal realism was mainly conceptual, while the
ambition of the progressive property movement is unabashedly normative: it
calls for the furtherance of such values as civil responsibility, environmental
stewardship, life, human flourishing, autonomy, freedom, and “individual and
social well-being.”14 Furthermore, the progressive property movement
statement contains a call to change property law so as to “promote the ability
of each person to obtain the material resources necessary for full social and
political participation.”15 Yet, as Ezra Rosser explained, the gist of the
progressive property concept is “to recognize more exceptions to the default
rights of an owner to exclude, or put differently, to expand recognition of the
public’s interest in privately held property.”16 Accordingly, we refer to
progressive property scholars as the “pro-access camp.”
The alternative to progressive property can be dubbed exclusion
essentialism, and it is central to the work of scholars such as Thomas Merrill
and Henry Smith alone and together. Merrill and Smith do not value
exclusion in its own right. Rather, they view it as an important organizing
principle that enables parties to economize on information and transaction
costs. The exclusion approach allows for delineation of clear rights and
boundaries at a relatively low cost and as befits in rem rights that avail against
the rest of the world. The economies achieved through exclusion enhance the
value of resources and minimize the potential for conflict. Throughout this
Article, we refer to champions of this approach as the “pro-exclusion camp.”
Nowhere are the fault lines between the two camps clearer than in the
context of the right to roam. The right to roam, also known as “everyman’s
right,” permits the public at large to venture into private property for
recreational purposes. In countries in which the right is recognized, private
property owners are not allowed to bar members of the public from entering
their land or from using it for recreation. The right to roam is of ancient
provenance in the Nordic countries of Finland, Iceland, Sweden, and Norway,
as well as in Baltic countries and Scotland. In 2000, it was codified in England
and Wales, and, in 2003, it was enacted in Scotland. Celebrating this trend,
13 See Gregory S. Alexander, Eduardo M. Peñalver, Joseph William Singer & Laura S.
Underkuffler, A Statement of Progressive Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 743, 744 (2009) (asserting that
values implicated by property “cannot be adequately understood or analyzed through a single metric”).
14 Id. at 743.
15 Id. at 744.
16 Ezra Rosser, The Ambition and Transformative Potential of Progressive Property, 101 CALIF. L.
REV. 107, 145 (2013).
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Greg Alexander argued that willingness to recognize the right to roam could
be used as a measure of the degree of democratization in a given society.17
Taking a markedly more guarded approach to the issue, Henry Smith
cautioned that “giving the right-to-roam stick to a neighbor or to the public
affects the value of the remaining property.”18
Remarkably, this crucial scholarly debate that engulfed the world of
property remains, to date, purely theoretical. The arguments of each camp
are completely devoid of empirical support. But what is the value of the right
to exclude? How sensitive is the right to exclude to incursions of the type
sanctioned by the right to roam, and how much value, if any, stands to be lost
if the right to roam is formalized?
In this Article, we exploit the passage of a right-to-roam statute in
England and Wales in 2000 to analyze the net change in the price of real
estate affected by this abridgement of the right to exclude. Comparing areas
where there was likely to be little effect of the law with areas where the expected
effect was greater, we find that property values declined substantially, and the
effect appears to be causal. To the extent that access rights and exclusion rights
are capitalized into real estate values, this suggests that the loss of exclusion
rights dominates the increase in access rights. We believe this is the first
formal econometric evaluation of these competing interests.
A cautionary note is in order here. Our findings should not be interpreted
as a flat-out rejection of the right to roam or the general extent to which
society values access relative to exclusion. Our goal was to measure the cost
to property owners of increased access. It is possible, of course, that the
benefits to the general public from increased access exceed this cost if the
access rights of individuals outside of the local real estate market are highly
valued but are not capitalized into local real estate values through, for
example, increased tourism revenue and local employment effects. Also, a
comprehensive cost–benefit analysis must take into account the subjective
value to roamers, who can now engage in their beloved activity more freely
and extensively, as well as the option value to non-roamers who know they
could roam. These values are highly subjective and are thus often difficult to
measure. For this reason, we focus on the cost side of the equation.
Granted, information about the loss to private property owners from legal
interventions that compromise their exclusion rights does not furnish a
complete basis for assessing new policies, but it does provide lawmakers with
an important benchmark against which to measure the potential benefits that
17 See generally Gregory S. Alexander, The Sporting Life: Democratic Culture and the Historical
Origins of the Scottish Right to Roam, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 321 (using the public’s right to roam as a
lens through which to examine the democratization of society in Scotland).
18 Henry E. Smith, Property Is Not Just a Bundle of Rights, 8 ECON J. WATCH 279, 286 (2011).
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are supposed to accrue from different policies. It should be added that
lawmaking in all areas tends to rely on incomplete information. Lawmakers
typically have information about the costs of various measures, but the
benefits can only be conjectured. Therefore, our study aims to put lawmaking
in the property domain on equal footing with lawmaking in other domains.
Finally, our study is uniquely important for U.S. policymakers because,
in the United States, private property enjoys constitutional protection that
does not exist in European countries. Under extant takings jurisprudence,
formalization of a right to roam would likely amount to a taking of a public
easement that requires compensation under the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.19 No such issue arose in England or Wales. Our study suggests
what the expected compensation would be if a right to roam were recognized.
Structurally, the remainder of the Article unfolds in four parts. In Part I,
we discuss the place of the right to exclude in different traditions and schools
of thought. In Part II, we explore the history and legal contours of the right
to roam. In Part III, we lay out our empirical research design, discuss our
results, and analyze the implications of our results to the debate about the
centrality of the right to exclude. A short conclusion follows.
I. THE RIGHT TO EXCLUDE AND ITS PLACE IN PROPERTY LAW
Since antiquity, property law has been organized around three principal
themes. The first was the res; property law was thought of as the legal field
that deals with relationships between “person and thing.”20 The second theme
was the in rem nature of property rights. Property rights were traditionally
conceived as rights that avail against all other persons in the world.21 The
third and final theme was exclusion.22 The concept of exclusion has come to
define the essence of the relationship between rights-holders and the rest of
the world.23
In the following paragraphs, we discuss the evolution of the concept of
property in scholarly writings and court decisions. Naturally, our main focus
19 See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979) (holding that the creation of
a public right of access to a private pond constitutes a taking under the Fifth Amendment and cannot
be carried out without the payment of just compensation). For further discussion, see infra Part III.
20 See Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691, 1691 (2012)
(providing a history of the laws of property as one between people and things being conceptualized).
21 Merrill & Smith, supra note 4, at 358-59.
22 See Daniel B. Kelly, The Right to Include, 63 EMORY L.J. 857, 862 (2014) (“Historically, in
analyzing property, many jurists have emphasized the role of exclusion.”).
23 See Jeremy Waldron, Property and Ownership (“‘Private property’ refers to a kind of system
that allocates particular objects like pieces of land to particular individuals to use and manage as
they please, to the exclusion of others (even others who have a greater need for the resources) and
to the exclusion also of any detailed control by society.”), in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2016).
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is the right to exclude. However, we refer to the two other traditional
characteristics of property law: its focus on things and the in rem nature of
the protection it bestows.
The right to exclude may be traced back to Roman law. Roman law did
not develop a full-fledged definition of ownership.24 It was not concerned
with enumerating the elements of ownership, let alone ranking them. Instead,
it maintained a practical, rather than theoretical or conceptual, focus.25 As a
result, the right to exclude was not explicitly recognized by Roman law.26 Yet,
its existence was “an implicit assumption, part of the substructure of Roman
Property law.”27
It was during the Enlightenment era, however, that the right to exclude
rose to prominence. Hugo Grotius, for example, deemed the right to exclude
as the centerpiece of ownership, explaining that “‘ownership’ connotes
possession of something peculiarly one’s own; that is to say, something
belonging to a given party in such a way that it cannot be similarly possessed
by any other party.”28 Samuel Pufendorf echoed the same sentiment when he
wrote that dominion entailed the power “to dispose of things, which belong
to us as our own, at our pleasure, and to keep all others from using them.”29
While Pufendorf highlighted the owner’s abilities to dispose of her assets and
use them as she pleases, both are undergirded by the owner’s right to exclude.
For it is the right to exclude that prevents others from interfering with the
owner’s use and power to transfer.
The right to exclude reached its zenith in the work of the English jurist
William Blackstone. Blackstone famously elevated the right to exclude above
all other rights, powers, and privileges associated with private property—he
treated exclusion as the very essence of property when he described the right
of property as “that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and
exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right
of any other individual in the universe.”30 In this oft-cited statement, Blackstone
24 See Peter Birks, The Roman Law Concept of Dominium and the Idea of Absolute Ownership, 1985
ACTA JURIDICA 1, 3 (noting that Roman jurists took the phenomenon of property ownership for
granted, and thus did not attempt to define it); see also ALAN RODGER, OWNERS AND
NEIGHBOURS IN ROMAN LAW 1 (1972).
25 See TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW 13 n.46 (2011) (noting that scholars of Roman law
assumed that “Roman lawyers were more interested in the meaningful, real-world application of
legal concepts and that they were generally reluctant to use definitions in civil law”).
26 JOHN G. SPRANKLING, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PROPERTY 307 (2014).
27 Id.
28 HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE PRAEDAE COMMENTARIUS: COMMENTARY ON THE LAW
OF PRIZE AND BOOTY 227 (Gwladys L. Williams & Walter H. Zeydel trans., Oxford Univ. Press
1950) (1868).
29 SAMUEL PUFENDORF, 2 DE JURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM LIBRI OCTO 533 (C.H.
Oldfather et al. trans., Clarendon Press 1934) (1672).
30 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at *2.
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turned the right to exclude into the defining characteristic of private property.
To be fair to Blackstone, it must be noted that many scholars believe that
Blackstone himself did not endorse the extreme view that is so widely attributed
to him.31 Yet, he became the flag bearer for the property as exclusion view.
It is important to note that Blackstone was not alone in regarding
exclusion as the essence of ownership. Even jurists, who did not adopt an
absolutist view of exclusion, agreed about its centrality to ownership. For
example, Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote,
But what are the rights of ownership? They are substantially the same as those
incident to possession. Within the limits prescribed by policy, the owner is
allowed to exercise his natural powers over the subject-matter uninterfered
with, and is more or less protected in excluding other people from such
interference. The owner is allowed to exclude all, and is accountable to no
one but him.32

The opening salvo in the scholarly attack on the right to exclude came at
the turn of the twentieth century with the writings of Wesley Newcomb
Hohfeld. Interestingly, Hohfeld was not a specialized property scholar. Rather,
he was a general theorist with a keen interest in legal concepts. As such, he
sought to devise a comprehensive scheme of legal concepts. He maintained
that all legal entitlements can be divided into four entitlements—claim rights,
privileges, powers, and immunities—and their jural correlatives—duties, norights, liabilities, and disabilities.33
Hohfeld outright rejected the characterization of property as the law that
governs relations between persons and things. According to Hohfeld, it made
absolutely no sense to speak of rights against things.34 Property rights, like
all other rights, were about relations among persons.35
Furthermore, Hohfeld found no particular use for the classification of
property rights as in rem rights. He viewed this classification as a mere

31 Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property Talk, or, Blackstone’s Anxiety, 108 YALE L.J. 601 (1998); see
also David B. Schorr, How Blackstone Became a Blackstonian, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 103,
105 (2009) (suggesting that “the anointment of Blackstone as the symbol of property absolutism is
more than a quirk of intellectual history—it is perverse”).
32 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 193 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., Belknap
Press 1963) (1881).
33 Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 30 (1913) (laying out this theory of legal relations in opposition to the
overly simplistic model of “rights” and “duties”).
34 See id. at 23-24 (insisting that all legal interests are incorporeal and thus only applied
amongst people).
35 Id.
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obfuscation that served no real purpose.36 He suggested that so-called in rem
rights are actually no more, or less, than aggregations of in personam rights.37
He further opined that only when in rem rights are broken down into their
component in personam rights can the precise content of a right and its
variation from one duty bearer to another be perceived.38
Finally, Hohfeld maintained that it was impossible to reduce property
relationships into a single exclusive feature—be it the right to exclude or any
other right. In his view, a property right is a “complex aggregate of rights (or
claims), privileges, powers, and immunities.”39 In Hohfeld’s view, ownership,
or the fee simple right, bestowed upon its holder the right to exclude certain
people from entering her land; an indefinite number of privileges to enter,
use, and abuse her land; the power to transfer her interest to third parties;
and multiple immunities that prevent others from appropriating her set of
entitlements.40 Hohfeld further noted that “[b]ecause ownership is relational,
no person can enjoy complete freedom to use, possess, enjoy, or transfer,” and
thus, the real question becomes how much freedom should be given to owners
and what level of interference they should be expected to endure.41 He also
wished to emphasize the social and political aspects of court decisions relating
to property.42
Hohfeld’s conceptualization was seized upon by the legal realists, who
recast it to produce the bundle of rights view of property.43 The legal realism
movement that peaked in the first half of the twentieth century was
predicated on the notion that law should not be studied as a self-contained
discipline. The legal realists sought to explore the social effects of legal
institutions and, in particular, the distribution of power and wealth generated
by various legal arrangements.44 They were far less interested in the law in
the books than in how the law operates on the ground. Accordingly, they
36 See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning,
26 YALE L.J. 710, 720 (1917) (“[T]he expression ‘right in rem’ is all too frequently misconceived, and
meanings attributed to it that could not fail to blur and befog legal thought and argument.”).
37 See id. at 722-23 (“What is here insisted on—i.e., that all rights in rem are against persons,—is
not to be regarded merely as a matter of taste or preference . . . . Logical consistency seems to
demand such a conception, and nothing less than that.”). Hohfeld preferred to call in rem rights
“multital” rights and in personam rights “paucital” rights. Id. at 723.
38 See id. at 742-44 (arguing that distinct rights and their independence can be evicted by
looking at property rights in this way).
39 Id. at 746.
40 Id.
41 Denise R. Johnson, Reflections on the Bundle of Rights, 32 VT. L. REV. 247, 251 (2007).
42 Id. at 252.
43 See generally Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8 (1927); see also
Max Radin, A Restatement of Hohfeld, 51 HARV. L. REV. 1141, 1159-60 (1938) (discussing the right of
alienation as a power incident to property ownership).
44 LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE: 1927–1960 3 (1986).
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saw little value in legal concepts and abstractions.45 It is a bit paradoxical,
therefore, that the legal realists drew their inspiration from Hohfeld, who was
first and foremost a conceptualist.
The legal realists have embraced the Hohfeldian framework and, in
particular, the idea that property was a state-backed institution that governed
relations among people.46 Furthermore, they set out to detail the effect of
private property on third parties. In an influential article, Morris Cohen
argued that private property is a form of sovereignty and that it is therefore
“necessary to apply to the law of property all those considerations of social
ethics and enlightened public policy which ought to be brought to the
discussion of any just form of government.”47 Felix Cohen, another prominent
figure in the realist movement,48 railed against the notion that private
property is a private institution. He maintained that since private property
affects the rest of our society, it must be viewed as a social institution.
Furthermore, the state plays a key role in the recognition and enforcement of
private property rights.49 Hence, private property cannot simply be justified
by reference to the gains it produces for owners; rather, it is necessary to
examine the effect of private property on nonowners as well as owners.50
The realists further deemphasized the role of the right to exclude, putting
it on par with other rights and capacities. To them, property was a bundle of
rights or sticks. Or, simply put, property was an aggregation of entitlements
that the law granted to property owners.51 There was no agreement among
legal realists about the precise content of the rights in the bundle, nor did
they converge on any specific enumeration. On the minimalist view, ownership

45 See id. at 4-5 (noting that legal realists “focused on the interrelationship between law and society
and refused to believe that legal concepts and rules were the sole determinants of judicial decisions”).
46 The view of “property as social relations” is widely attributed to Morris Cohen. See Stephen
R. Munzer, Property as Social Relations (discussing Morris Cohen’s contributions to legal realism in
the law of property), in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 36,
38 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001).
47 Cohen, supra note 43, at 14.
48 On the contribution of Felix Cohen to legal realism, see Martin P. Golding, Realism and
Functionalism in the Legal Thought of Felix S. Cohen, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1032, 1033 (1981), which
notes that “Cohen’s work is of special interest to anyone attempting to come to grips with the realist
movement,” and Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 465, 470 n.6 (1988)
(reviewing KALMAN, supra note 44), which describes Felix Cohen as a central figure in the legal
realist movement.
49 See Cohen, supra note 5, at 360 (characterizing property law as “an attempt upon the part of
the state . . . to give a systematized recognition . . . of these attitudes and desires on the part of
individuals towards things”).
50 See id. at 362-63 (conceptualizing property as primarily relational).
51 See, e.g., United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 278 (2002) (“A common idiom describes
property as a ‘bundle of sticks’—a collection of individual rights which, in certain combinations,
constitute property.”).
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conferred the rights to possess, use, exclude, and transfer property.52 However,
some scholars espoused a much broader view. Honoré, for example, listed as
many as eleven incidents in his definition of ownership—the right to possess,
the right to manage, the right to derive income, and several others.53 The
bundle of rights conception was, therefore, more of a framework for thinking
about the meaning of property than a precise definition of the term.
More importantly, the bundle of rights conception offered an infinitely
malleable view of property.54 It allowed for the abridgement and even
abrogation of the various rights in the bundle without any detraction from
the status of the bundle, or what remained of it, as property. The contours and
the content of the bundle were blurry and shifting. Nonetheless, some of the
leaders of the movement viewed the right to exclude as the only right that was
indispensable to the definition of property. Morris Cohen, for one, believed that,
at the end of the day, property boiled down to a government-enforced right to
exclude others.55 Felix Cohen, too, echoed the same view when he concluded
that “[p]rivate property . . . must at least involve a right to exclude others
from doing something.”56
The bundle of rights metaphor was adopted by the first Restatement of
193657 and even influenced the Supreme Court. In its takings jurisprudence,
the Supreme Court repeatedly used the bundle of rights conception of
property.58 At the same time, however, the Supreme Court emphasized the
importance of the right to exclude, calling it “one of the most essential sticks
in the bundle.”59 More importantly, the Supreme Court granted special
protection to private property owners against government incursions that

52 This view was adopted by the Supreme Court in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982).
53 A.M. Honoré, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 107, 113 (A.G. Guest ed.,
1961). It is important to note that Honoré’s list also includes duties, such as the duty to prevent harm.
54 See Anna di Robilant, Property: A Bundle of Sticks or a Tree?, 66 VAND. L. REV. 869, 886
(2013) (“[A] fundamental intuition of the bundle of rights approach is that the bundle is malleable
rather than having a prefixed and coherent structure or essence.”).
55 See Cohen, supra note 43, at 12 (“The law does not guarantee me the physical or social ability
of actually using what it calls mine . . . . [I]t may indirectly aid me by removing certain general
hindrances to the enjoyment of property. But the law of property helps me directly only to exclude
others from using the things which it assigns to me.”).
56 Cohen, supra note 5, at 371.
57 See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY ch. 1, intro. note, § 5 (AM. LAW INST. 1936).
58 See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979).
59 Id.; see also Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 393 (1994) (recognizing the fundamentalism
of the right to exclude as characterized in Kaiser); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1044
(1992) (referring to the right to exclude as “one of the most essential sticks” in the bundle of rights);
Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987) (same); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982) (“The power to exclude has traditionally been considered one
of the most treasured strands in an owner’s bundle of property rights.”).
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negate or compromise the right to exclude.60 The Supreme Court has
consistently and steadfastly adhered to the view that permanent physical
occupations of private property invariably amount to a compensable taking
under the Fifth Amendment, even if the amount taken is vanishingly small.
For example, in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., the Supreme
Court ruled that New York legislation that compelled private property owners
to allow cable companies to install a small cable box on buildings’ roofs and
run cables along the walls was an unconstitutional taking of property, since it
compromised the buildings’ owners’ right to exclude.61 Similarly, in Kaiser
Aetna v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the imposition of a
navigational servitude on private property could not be effected without
compensation as that, too, infringed on the property owner’s right to exclude.62
Over time, however, the bundle of rights view of property has begun to
lose ground. In the last three decades, the scholarly pendulum has swung away
from the bundle of rights conception and back toward the exclusion theory.63
Scholars have argued that the bundle of rights theory led to the disintegration
of property64 and that, effectively, it was not a theory at all.65 The
dissatisfaction with the bundle of rights conceptualization revived theoretical
interest in the right to exclude theory of property.
Nearly two decades ago, James Penner mounted a frontal attack on the
Hohfeldian edifice. In rejecting the bundle of rights theory, Penner wrote
that property is not “some bundled together aggregate or complex of norms,
but a single, coherent right”—the right to exclusive use.66 Penner’s theory
puts the premium on exclusive use of assets67 and justifies the right to exclude
as a means of securing this goal. He further argued that the correlative of the
right to exclude is a single in rem duty, which applies to the rest of the world,

60 See Elizabeth M. Glazer, Rule of (Out)law: Property’s Contingent Right to Exclude, 156 U. PA.
L. REV. PENNUMBRA 331, 332 (2008) (“Despite Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld’s and A.M. Honoré’s
efforts to bundle it with the rights to use, possess, and transfer property, the right to exclude has
enjoyed an elevated status . . . .” (footnotes omitted)).
61 458 U.S. at 419.
62 444 U.S. at 179-80.
63 See HANOCH DAGAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND
RETHINKING PRIVATE LAW THEORY 164-65 (2013) (noting that “[a]fter decades in which the
bundle-of-sticks picture . . . had been regarded as the conventional wisdom, several leading property
scholars are again considering the right to exclude as the most defining feature of property”).
64 Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in PROPERTY: NOMOS XXII 69 (J. Roland
Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980).
65 See Smith, supra note 20, at 1700 (claiming that “[p]roperty as a bundle of sticks could be a
partial outlook, but [it] is not a theory”).
66 J.E. Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 754 (1996).
67 See PENNER, supra note 10, at 71 (“[T]he right to property is a right to exclude others from
things which is grounded by the interest we have in the use of things.” (emphasis omitted)).
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to abstain from interfering with the property of others.68 It bears emphasis
that Penner does not oppose the sharing of assets; on the contrary, he actually
views it as a laudable social goal intrinsic to the idea of property.69 In his view,
however, sharing should arise voluntarily and not be compelled by law.70
In another influential article, Tom Merrill argued that the right to exclude
is the sine qua non of property, stating, “Give someone the right to exclude
others from a valued resource, i.e., a resource that is scarce relative to the
human demand for it, and you give them property. Deny someone the
exclusion right and they do not have property.”71 In Merrill’s view, all of the
other rights and incidents that are associated with ownership, such as the right
to possess, the right to use, and the power to transfer, emanate from the right
to exclude.72 Exclusion, in other words, guarantees all of the other rights,
powers, privileges, and immunities of property owners. It is, therefore, a
necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of property.
The renaissance of the exclusionary view is due in major part to the work
of Henry Smith. In an elaborate body of work, Henry Smith, alone and with
Tom Merrill, has sought to resurrect the three constituent elements of the
traditional view of property—i.e., that property is the law of things, that it is
organized around the idea of in rem rights, and that the right to exclude is
the keystone right. Notably, Merrill and Smith have advanced a unifying
utilitarian theory that justifies all three elements: the information costs theory.
The first step in doing so was to reinstate the in rem nature of property
rights. Merrill and Smith have powerfully argued that the in rem nature of
property rights is the key to understanding the field. As rights in rem that
avail against the rest of the world, property rights oblige nonowners to inform
themselves about their duties vis-à-vis property owners.73 This process is
obviously costly, and the more complex, idiosyncratic, and undecipherable

68 See Penner, supra note 66, at 807-08 (explaining that the duty is viable because individuals
can recognize when property does not belong to them).
69 See id. at 745 (“[T]he ability to share one’s things, or let others use them, is fundamental in
the idea of property.”).
70 See id. (describing how the reality of social interaction requires alienability to be voluntary).
71 Merrill, supra note 9, at 730.
72 See id. at 730-31 (describing the various rights associated with the right to exclude); see also
Thomas W. Merrill, The Property Prism, 8 ECON J. WATCH 247, 249 (2011) (noting that “the
essentialist thesis can be re-described as the claim that there must always be one stick in the bundle—
e.g., the right to exclude”).
73 See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The
Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 8 (2000) (suggesting that the in rem nature of property
rights means that third parties must determine the attributes of these rights in order to avoid violating
them or to acquire them from the present holders); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What
Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 359 (2001) (explaining that the
notification feature of property “imposes an informational burden on large numbers of people”).

2017]

The Value of the Right to Exclude

931

property rights are, the higher the cost to third parties. Hence, in the context
of property law, clarity and simplicity are of great importance.
In keeping with this insight, Henry Smith has insisted that property is, after
all, “the law of things.” For information cost reasons, it makes sense for property
law to take advantage of the clear and well-defined boundaries of things, or
assets, as a mechanism for communicating information to third parties as to their
duties and liberties in their interactions with property owners.74
Similarly, Smith views exclusion as a cost-effective way, or strategy,75 of
conveying information to third parties. The exclusion right imposes on others a
broad duty of forbearance that is clear and simple. Importantly, Smith does not
consider exclusion a value, but rather “a rough first cut—and only that—at
serving the purposes of property.”76 Merrill and Smith also argued that the legal
duty to forebear from encroaching on others’ assets is consistent with our
moral intuitions,77 which, in turn, further economizes on information costs.
Therefore, from the perspective of information costs, it makes sense to construct
property law around clearly defined assets and a broad duty to forebear.78
Other utilitarian justifications of the right to exclude concentrate on the
efficient use of assets. In his seminal article, Toward a Theory of Property Rights,
Demsetz famously wrote, “[A]n owner, by virtue of his power to exclude others,
. . . [has] incentives to utilize resources more efficiently.”79 The assignment of
a single owner with broad exclusionary powers, explained Demsetz, would
ensure that the owner would bear the full marginal cost, as well as enjoy the full

74 See Smith, supra note 20, at 1709-10 (describing the societal impact of in rem rights and the
benefits associated with a simplified system).
75 Smith repeatedly uses the term “exclusion strategy.” See Smith, supra note 18, at 281-82
(describing the “exclusion strategy” as a means of “delegat[ing] to owners a choice of a range of uses”
for resources by dividing the world into chunks and allowing each chunk’s owner to determine who
can access it); see also Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating
Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453, S468-69 (2002) [hereinafter Smith, Exclusion Versus
Governance] (discussing the use of the exclusion strategy to measure costs of a resource); Henry E.
Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1745
(2007) (stating that property relies on the exclusion strategy to protect “rights-holders’ interests in
the use of resources indirectly, by using a simple signal for violations”).
76 Smith, supra note 18, at 1705.
77 See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1849, 1853-58 (2007) (arguing that morality is a source of support for our system of in rem
duties of abstention).
78 See Smith, supra note 18, at 1693 (noting that “property defines things using an exclusion
strategy of ‘keep off ’ or ‘don’t touch’”).
79 Demsetz, supra note 11, at 356.
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marginal benefit, of her actions with respect to the resource.80 Hence, broad
exclusion power creates optimal incentives to use assets efficiently.81
Steven Shavell proffered a different efficiency-based justification for the
right to exclude. Shavell astutely observed that in the absence of a right to
exclude, possessors of assets would devote considerable resources to protect
their possessions from predators. Such expenditures would be wasteful if the
state, by enacting a right to exclude, protects rightful possessors more costeffectively.82
There are also several non-utilitarian accounts that put the right to
exclude at the heart of property law. The first non-utilitarian account dates
back to Aristotle, who justified the right to exclude by reference to the
concept of virtue.83 Aristotle argued that only against a background norm of
exclusion can owners signal their virtue by waiving their right to exclude.84
In other words, a baseline of exclusion enables a separating equilibrium in
which virtuous owners distinguish themselves from the general pool by
forsaking their right to exclude.
Modern theorists justified the right to exclude on several other grounds.
Jeremy Waldron, for example, justified the right to exclude by reference to
the values of liberty and privacy. Waldron proposed that the right to exclude
forms an important “realm of private freedom . . . where [one] can make
decisions about what to do and how to do it, justifying these decisions if at
all only to [one]self.”85 In a similar vein, Waldron argued that individuals
“need a refuge from the general society of mankind[,] . . . a place where they

80 See id. Some context is in order here. Demsetz compared two prototypical property regimes:
communal property and private property. He noted that in communal property regimes, each co-owner
can externalize costs onto other co-owners by increasing her consumption of the underlying resource,
be it land, water, or any other tangible asset. Id. at 354-55. This problem is inimical to communal
property regimes since they allow each user to enjoy the marginal benefit of her actions, while bearing
only a small fraction of their marginal cost, with the remainder of the cost externalized to others. Id.
City parks provide a helpful illustration. Visitors to a city park often use the park for their enjoyment
but then leave and impose the cleanup costs on the entire population of the city. Demsetz demonstrated
that the adoption of a private property regime with a single owner can alleviate this problem by
concentrating all of the costs and all of the benefits in the hands of one person. Id. at 356-57.
81 A notable exception is a case in which there are complementarities among different assets
and transaction costs are high. We discuss this possibility below in Part II.
82 See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 20 (2004). For
a contrary view, see Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Case for Imperfect Enforcement of
Property Rights, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1927 (2012), which argues against state enforcement of private
property rights.
83 ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 26-27 (Stephen Everson ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988).
84 See id. at 27, ll. 12-14 (“No one, when men have all things in common, will any longer set an
example of liberality or do any liberal action; for liberality consists in the use which is made of
property.”).
85 JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 295 (1988).
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can be assured of being alone . . . or assured of the conditions of intimacy
with others.”86
Finally, Shyamkrishna Balganesh has constructed a normative theory that
bases the right to exclude in the principle of inviolability.87 The principle of
inviolability “refers to the idea that certain entities (things and persons) are
considered off-limits, by default to everyone.”88 According to Balganesh, it is
well-established among anthropologists and sociologists that the idea of
inviolability is embedded in all cultures and applies both to persons and
things.89 As far as its applicability to things is concerned, “the norm of
inviolability requires individuals to stay away from things unless, through
some socially accepted practice (such as first possession, or consumption),
they have a legitimate claim over them.”90 Balganesh emphasizes that the
norm of inviolability is entrenched in social practice and that it provides the
best explanation for the centrality of the right to exclude to property law.91
In the last few years, however, a new challenge was leveled at the right to
exclude owing to the emergence of the progressive property movement. In
many important ways, the progressive property movement was born out of
legal realism. Moreover, several key figures in the new movement were deeply
influenced by the work of the legal realists.92 The progressive property
movement is predicated on the idea that property, like all other legal
institutions, should advance human flourishing. In keeping with this idea,
notable progressive property scholars, such as Greg Alexander, Hanoch
Dagan, Eduardo Peñalver, Joseph Singer, Laura Underkuffler, and Jedediah

Id. at 296.
See Balganesh, supra note 9 (arguing that the right to exclude follows from a universally
recognized obligation not to interfere with others’ belongings).
88 Id. at 620.
89 See id. (“Sociologists and anthropologists have long argued that the [principle of inviolability]
remains basic to all cultures, at all points in history, albeit to differing degrees and extents.”).
90 Id. at 621.
91 See id. at 622-25.
92 See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, Property and Social Relations: From Title to Entitlement (citing
Frank Michelman to support the proposition that “[t]he very legitimacy of a property system
depends on the effect of conferring property rights on individuals and allowing those individuals to
assert those rights against others”), in PROPERTY AND VALUES: ALTERNATIVES TO PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE OWNERSHIP 3, 12 (Charles Geisler & Gail Daneker eds., 2000); Joseph William Singer,
Property as the Law of Democracy, 63 DUKE L.J. 1287, 1291-92 (2014) [hereinafter Singer, Property as
the Law of Democracy] (praising Henry Smith for “conceptualizing property . . . as a framework for
‘interactions of persons in society’ as well as the foundation and infrastructure of private law”); see
also HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY: VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS, at xvii (2011) (“This book offers
an understanding of property as institutions, with its jurisprudential underpinnings grounded in
legal realism . . . .”); Hanoch Dagan, The Craft of Property, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1517, 1520 (2003)
[hereinafter Dagan, The Craft of Property] (noting that legal realism underlies the conception of
property as important default frameworks of interpersonal interactions).
86
87
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Purdy,93 maintain that with property come not only rights but also
obligations. Legislators and courts, in designing property policy, must be
mindful of the needs not only of property owners, but of society at large.
Property rights must give way to broader social needs and values.
Furthermore, the progressive property movement has endorsed a
pluralistic vision of property.94 On this vision, property is supposed to
advance a wide range of values, ranging from “individual interests, wants,
needs, desires, and preferences” to “social interests, such as environmental
stewardship, civic responsibility, and aggregate wealth,” to general interests,
such as “life and human flourishing, the protection of physical security, the
ability to acquire knowledge and make choices, and the freedom to live one’s
life on one’s own terms.”95 The movement’s statement explicitly admits that
these values are incommensurable and therefore cannot be “analyzed through
a single metric” or “[r]educe[d] . . . to one common currency.”96
In light of the pluralistic vision of the movement, it is not surprising that
progressive property scholars are also unified in their rejection of the right to
exclude as the essence or core of property.97 The emergence of the progressive
property movement has resurrected the bundle of rights conception of
property and has put renewed pressure to scale back the right to exclude.98

93 See JEDEDIAH PURDY, THE MEANING OF PROPERTY 135 (2010) (describing how modern
property regimes developed as part of a social vision); Jedediah Purdy, A Freedom-Promoting Approach
to Property: A Renewed Tradition for New Debates, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1237, 1258-65 (2005) (proposing
a property system that embraces individual freedom); Jedediah Purdy, People as Resources: Recruitment
and Reciprocity in the Freedom-Promoting Approach to Property, 56 DUKE L.J. 1047, 1110-16 (2007)
(arguing that property law can and should promote human freedom by making negotiation, rather
than domination, the way in which people recruit others into their projects). Unlike the others listed,
Purdy does not claim to be a part of the progressive property movement despite his critique of
exclusion essentialism. See Gregory S. Alexander, Pluralism and Property, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1017,
1030-32 (2011) (understanding Purdy’s views within the context of pluralistic values in property law).
94 See Gregory S. Alexander, Eduardo M. Peñalver, Joseph William Singer & Laura S.
Underkuffler, supra note 13, at 743 (“Property implicates plural and incommensurable values.”).
95 Id.
96 Id. at 744.
97 See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, The Complex Core of Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1063,
1064 (2009) (arguing that there is a “basic difficulty” in the idea that property “is exclusion, and
everything else is a deviation from property”); Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in
American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745, 801-04 (2009) (describing how beach access cases
challenge the right to exclude conception of property); Dagan, The Craft of Property, supra note 92,
at 1558-65 (proposing a “realist” view of property that runs contrary to the right to exclude
conception); Eduardo M. Peñalver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821, 875-76 (2009)
(promoting “virtue theory” as the ideal framework for addressing property law); Singer, Property as
the Law of Democracy, supra note 92, at 1319-24 (noting that “owners have rights, but they also have
obligations” in a discussion of whether an owner has a right to leave a vacant lot empty when it could
be profitably developed).
98 See Ezra Rosser, The Ambition and Transformative Potential of Progressive Property, 101 CALIF.
L. REV. 107, 145 (2013) (suggesting that the core ambition of the progressive property movement is
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As one leading commentator astutely observed, this is not a coincidence.99
The right to exclude lies at the heart of the debate between exclusion theorists
and progressive property scholars because of the constitutional protection
granted to private property under the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.100 If courts accept the proposition that the right to exclude is
the sine qua non of private property and grant it special protection, it would
significantly undermine the ability of the state to advance the other goals of
the progressive property movement. Any incursion on the right to exclude
might require the government to pay just compensation to the affected
property owners. Conversely, if courts accept the view that the right to
exclude is merely another stick in the property bundle that may be removed
without any special consequences, it would give the state the liberty to adopt
policies that curb owners’ right to exclude with impunity.101
And so, today, the world of property theorists is deeply divided over the
centrality of the right to exclude to the definition of property.102 In the next Part,
we will discuss the implications of the scholarly debate about the right to exclude
in the context of the right to roam. We focus on the right to roam because it
epitomizes many of the values endorsed by progressive property theorists and
may even be justified from a purely utilitarian perspective. Furthermore, the
right to roam, as presently adopted in several foreign legal systems, represents
a relatively minimal incursion on property owners’ right to exclude.
II. THE RIGHT TO ROAM
Nowhere does the case of the progressive property movement seem more
compelling than in the context of the right to roam. The right to roam
empowers the general public to hike and engage in minimally intrusive
recreational activities on qualifying private properties. Importantly for our
purposes, it provides a unique opportunity to examine a concrete example that
involves the theoretical disagreement between pro-access and pro-exclusion
“to recognize more exceptions to the default rights of an owner to exclude, or put differently, to
expand recognition of the public’s interest in privately held property”).
99 See Merrill, supra note 72, at 248 (“The Realists and their modern heirs embraced the bundle
because the idea of moving sticks in and out of bundles suggests the futility of giving significant
constitutional protection to property.”).
100 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.”).
101 See Merrill, supra note 72, at 248 (explaining how the bundle metaphor could be used to
either encourage or discourage payment of compensation under the Takings Clause).
102 See Lee Anne Fennell, The Problem of Resource Access, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1471, 1477 (2013)
(observing that “[p]roperty theory today is alive with debate on core questions of entitlement
design: whether property rules or liability rules should dominate, whether an exclusion- or thingbased vision of property should trump the bundle-of-rights metaphor, whether fixed tenure menus
aid or impede efficiency, and so on”).
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scholars. Despite the strong rhetoric sometimes employed by scholars from
both sides,103 the disagreement between the two camps is a matter of degree,
not kind. Pro-access, or progressive property, scholars do not deny the
importance of the right to exclude to property; rather, they argue that it must
sometimes give way to other important values. Pro-exclusion scholars no
longer maintain—and with the possible exception of Blackstone, never did
maintain—that the right to exclude is absolute and, by and large, acknowledge
the need to scale it back under appropriate circumstances.104 The right to
roam provides us a test case through the study of which we can contextualize
the grand debate that engulfed the property world.105
Several characteristics make the right to roam an especially interesting
opportunity for clarifying the differences in the views of pro-access scholars
and pro-exclusion scholars. First, the right to roam implicates a relatively
minimal intrusion on owners’ right to exclude. As we will show, the right to
roam, as it was adopted in all countries in which it exists, does not deprive
property owners of land and is carefully crafted to ensure that hikers do not
interfere with owners’ possession or use rights. Second, there are prima facie
efficiency and justice reasons to recognize the right to roam. It is often
necessary to gain access to multiple parcels to complete a certain hike or trail.

103 See Merrill, supra note 9, at 730 (“Give someone the right to exclude others from a valued
resource . . . and you give them property. Deny someone the exclusion right and they do not have
property.”); Penner, supra note 66, at 714 (“‘Property is a bundle of rights’ is little more than a
slogan. . . . By ‘slogan’ I mean an expression that conjures up an image, but which does not represent
any clear thesis or set of propositions. But like all good slogans, it rhetorically assuages the unease
that results from our knowing there are real problems which, if plainly articulated, would demand
serious consideration.”); Smith, supra note 20, at 1692 (“[T]he extreme realist picture . . . is myopic,
inflexible, and ultimately unworkable . . . .”); see also Eric R. Claeys, Virtue and Rights in American
Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 889, 890 (2009) (“The Social-Obligation Norm and Land Virtues
may encourage lawyers and scholars to leap out of an economic frying pan into a political-philosophy
fire.”); Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809,
815 (1935) (“The circularity of legal reasoning in the whole field of unfair competition is veiled by
the ‘thingification’ of property.”); Adam Mossoff, The False Promise of the Right to Exclude, 8 ECON J.
WATCH 255, 256 (2011) (“[L]awyers and economists should be wary of the theoretical promise of
practical determinacy that is offered by the exclusion conception of property.”); Singer, supra note
92, at 1299 (“Information costs help us manage in the world, but they are neither the only thing we
care about nor the most important.”). For a neat overview of the different theoretical positions in
this grand debate, see John A. Lovett, Progressive Property in Action: The Land Reform (Scotland) Act
2003, 89 NEB. L. REV. 739, 743 (2011), which calls 2000–2009 the decade of “the noughties” and
characterizes the scholarly discussion of property law as “an on-going, high level debate between two
rival camps of property theorists about the fundamental structure and values of property law in
general and over the nature and importance of the right to exclude in particular.”
104 See Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance, supra note 75, at S454 (noting that rights “fall on a
spectrum between the poles of exclusion and governance”).
105 See Lovett, supra note 103, at 740 (“For more than a decade two rival camps of property
theorists have made powerful, often intricate, and seemingly irreconcilable claims about the function
and normative value of exclusion rules in property law.”).
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Hence, if members of the public were to try to obtain the right through
voluntary market transactions, they would invariably run into the twin
problems of high transaction costs and strategic holdouts (owners who would
deny them permission in order to extract as much of a bargaining surplus as
possible). These twin problems are well-known from the takings literature on
eminent domain and, in fact, constitute the standard justification for
recognizing the power of eminent domain in the government. The right to
roam is also appealing on distributive justice grounds as it benefits the public
at large at the expense of potentially affluent property owners by making the
latter’s lots subject to roaming rights. Third, and perhaps most important, the
right to roam was enacted, among other places, in England, Wales, and
Scotland, common law countries whose property history and roots are similar
to those of the United States.106
In the remainder of this Part, we discuss the significance of the right to
roam to property theory and elaborate on the efficiency and justice reasons
that may be marshaled in support of its adoption. We then outline the legal
characteristics of the right to roam as it was enacted in various countries.
Because our empirical analysis is based on data from England and Wales, we
focus on the legal attributes of the right to roam in these two countries.
A. Theory
From a theoretical perspective, the right to roam provides a powerful
demonstration of the possibilities embedded in a use-based model of
property, namely a model that seeks to maximize aggregate use of assets
independently of their boundaries. For this reason and others, it has attracted
the attention of progressive property scholars. Progressive property scholars
have used the right to roam as a prime example of how the vision and ideals
of their movement can work in practice. For example, John Lovett described
the enactment of the right to roam in Scotland as “[p]rogressive [p]roperty
in [a]ction”107 and proposed that it can serve as a blueprint for legal reforms
in the United States.108 At the same time, the recognition of roaming rights
invariably necessitates imposing limitations on certain owners’ right to
exclude. Therefore, the right to roam embodies an inevitable tradeoff between
exclusion and access.

106 See id. at 742 (“[T]he [Land Reform (Scotland) Act] actually replaces the traditionally
robust, modular, ex ante presumption in favor of the right to exclude with a surprisingly simple, but
also robust, ex ante presumption in favor of responsible access.” (emphasis omitted)).
107 See generally id.
108 See id. at 742 (arguing that the Land Reform (Scotland) Act “shows us something important
about what is possible in property law design”).
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As important, one can make a prima facie case for adopting a right to
roam on both efficiency and distributive justice grounds. Consider the
efficiency justification first. Although there is broad consensus among
economists and law and economics scholars about the importance of the right
to exclude in incentivizing owners to make optimal decisions with respect to
their own assets, there is also universal recognition that strong exclusion
powers can thwart socially desirable enterprises involving multiple parcels of
land. To see this, assume that an entrepreneur (be it the government or a
private actor) wishes to construct a new highway or lay tracks for a high speed
railroad. Under all legal systems that respect property owners’ right to
exclude, the execution of the project would require the entrepreneur to secure
consent from all relevant owners. Yet, in many cases, doing so might prove
prohibitive. First, the need to engage multiple rights-holders in negotiations
requires expenditure of significant resources, and the cost rises as the number
of rights-holders increases. Second, each rights-holder has an incentive to
hold out in the hope of extracting the lion’s share of the contractual surplus
from the entrepreneur. Since the last remaining owner has the most leverage
in negotiating with the entrepreneur, as the fate of the project hinges on her
consent, all owners are likely to refuse to tender early.109 The need to
overcome the problems of high transaction costs and strategic holdouts is the
standard justification for government intervention in land use planning, in
general, and the government’s ability to condemn private property by
eminent domain, in particular.110
Furthermore, Michael Heller, both alone and with Rebecca Eisenberg, has
shown that the dispersion of veto rights among multiple rights-holders often
leads to underutilization of assets.111 It can also block the development of
projects that involve complementarities among different assets.112 Roaming

109 See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1106-07 (1972) (discussing this
holdout problem in the context of property rule legal systems).
110 See id. (arguing that eminent domain solves the holdout problem by using government
power to set an objectively reasonable transaction price); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 22 (1972) (noting that one purpose of eminent domain is to prevent holdouts
from obtaining monopolies); Abraham Bell, Private Takings, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 517, 529-31 (2009)
(arguing that eminent domain “provides the solution to the strategic difficulties raised by . . .
holdout[s]”); Richard A. Epstein, Holdouts, Externalities, and the Single Owner: One More Salute to
Ronald Coase, 36 J.L. & ECON. 553, 572 (1993) (characterizing the government’s power of eminent
domain as “typically to prevent holdouts”).
111 See Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx
to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 677 (1998) (noting that a “tragedy of the anticommons can occur
when too many individuals have rights of exclusion in a scarce resource” (emphasis omitted)).
112 See MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY 1 (2008) (addressing this problem in
the broader corporate context); Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter
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rights are a case in point. Hiking trails, very much like roads, typically span
across multiple parcels. Moreover, there are obvious complementarities
among the different parcels over which a trail passes, which are best evidenced
by beach access cases.113 The omission of a few lots—and in some cases, even
a single lot—from a trail may critically undermine its utility to the public.
Further, outdoor activities are characterized by a high degree of spontaneity.
Hence, the higher the degree of freedom the public enjoys, the more the
public values the right to roam. Consequently, it is impractical to expect that
roaming rights will arise voluntarily via private transactions between
landowners and hikers. In light of the high number of parties involved (both
hikers and landowners) and their wide range of preferences, attempts to
devise roaming rights privately are likely to collapse under the weight of
transaction costs. For all of these reasons, an elaborate scheme of roaming
rights can generally only be established by the government.
The right to roam may also be justified on distributive justice grounds.
The formalization of a right to roam works to transfer wealth from individual
property owners to the public at large. To the extent that property ownership
is concentrated among those with higher than average wealth and that hikers
will tend to be of average wealth as they come from all corners of our society,
the recognition of a public right of access benefits the average citizen at the
expense of those who are generally better off. The Scottish experience
provides a vivid illustration of this effect. By some estimates, in 1995, 57.8%
of the land of Scotland was owned by only 1411 owners.114 Furthermore, many
of the largest estates in Scotland belong to absentee owners from other
countries, who visit their vast properties only periodically.115
Some property scholars argue that the right to roam is especially
appealing from a distributive perspective. In defending courts’ decisions to
grant public access to private beaches,116 Greg Alexander writes that public
access to beaches is “a valuable form of recreation” and that “[r]ecreation is
not a luxury but a necessity . . . [,] an important aspect of the capabilities of

Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 699 (1998) (demonstrating
this problem in the context of scientific research).
113 See, e.g., Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 828-29 (1987) (addressing state
regulations on a proposed house on beachfront property that would block the public’s view of the
coastline).
114 ANDY WIGHTMAN, WHO OWNS SCOTLAND 142-43, 158 tbl.3 (1996).
115 See Lovett, supra note 103, at 772 (noting “[t]he increasingly frequent phenomena of
absentee ownership” in Scotland).
116 See, e.g., Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc., 879 A.2d 112, 124 (N.J. 2005)
(holding that a portion of a beach club’s sands had to be available for public use and travel);
Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 368-69 (N.J. 1984) (holding that allowing
membership in a beach association supported public beach access).
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both life and sociability.”117 He proceeds to explain that there is “growing
medical evidence indicating that recreation and relaxation contribute
importantly to good health”118 and laments the fact that “some of the very
groups who need recreation the most often do not, as a practical matter, have
access to it.”119 As for sociability, Alexander postulates that “[a]s a good,
sociability encompasses subsidiary goods such as friendship and social
participation”—both of which are enhanced by public access to beaches.120 Of
course, Alexander’s arguments apply with equal force to access to other open
spaces and natural amenities, highlighting the powerful distributional case for
adopting a broad right to roam.
B. Law
The debate about the right to roam is not merely theoretical. Several
European countries, including some that come from the same property
tradition as the United States, recognize the right to roam. The European
experience with the right to roam can be viewed as a natural experiment from
which American scholars and policymakers alike can draw important lessons
as to the optimal design of the right to roam and the best way to implement
it. In the following paragraphs, we provide a comparative review of the right
to roam as it exists in various European countries. We put special emphasis
on the design of the right to roam in England and Wales as we use data from
these countries to examine the effect of the right on property values in Part III.
In feudal times, English commoners enjoyed a plethora of access and use
rights to lands that were held by feudal lords. These rights were largely
extinguished by the enclosure movement in the seventeenth and especially
eighteenth centuries via private agreements and legislation.121 As a consequence,
the English land system moved from a pragmatic model with multiple rightsholders in every lot to a model of exclusive ownership.122 At the turn of the
twentieth century, the general public in England had no access rights to
private property, except in those cases where permission was secured from
the relevant owner or granted specifically by statute.123
117 Gregory S. Alexander, Ownership and Obligations: The Human Flourishing Theory of Property,
43 H.K.L.J. 451, 460 (2013).
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 461.
121 See Stuart Banner, Transitions Between Property Regimes, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S359, S366
(2002) (describing enclosure as a “massive reorganization of property rights”).
122 See id.
123 See ANGELA SYDENHAM, PUBLIC RIGHTS OF WAY AND ACCESS TO LAND 196-97 (4th
ed. 2010) (discussing punishments for obstruction of highways and including gates, fences, and wires
as forms of obstruction); Jerry L. Anderson, Britain’s Right to Roam: Redefining the Landowner’s Bundle
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The first harbinger of change was the Law of Property Act of 1925, which
recognized a public right of access to common land in certain urban areas in
England and South Wales for purposes of “air and exercise.”124 The next
statutory intervention came after World War II, when the Parliament enacted
the National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act 1949 (NPACA). The
Act promoted open access in two principal ways. First, it encouraged landlords
to enter agreements that granted the public access rights over private lands with
local authorities.125 Second, it instructed local authorities to survey and map all
public rights of way in order to inform the public of its rights.126
The most important and comprehensive reform came half a century later
with the passage of the Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000.127 The Act
granted the general public in England and Wales a right of access to most
“open” areas in England and Wales.128 The legislation of the Act was followed
by an extensive effort to define and map the areas to which the right applied.
The mapping process was completed on October 31, 2005, at a cost of £69
million to the British public.129 The legislative scheme in England and Wales
recognizes a right to roam that applies to three main categories of land:130
(1) mapped open country; (2) mountain land; and (3) coastal land.131
The first category of mapped open country covers designated areas as they
appear on a conclusive map issued by the “appropriate countryside body” as
“open country.”132 “Open country,” in turn, is defined as land that “(a) appears
to the appropriate countryside body to consist wholly or predominantly of

of Sticks, 19 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 375, 394 (2007) (“In the end, the right to roam the
countryside was not recognized as important enough to justify a common law right. As a result lands
that for centuries had been open to the public for wandering were shut off by the landowner . . . .”).
124 Law of Property Act 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5 c. 20, § 193 (Eng. & Wales).
125 Lovett, supra note 103, at 769.
126 Id.
127 Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000, c. 37 (Eng. & Wales). The formalization of a
similar right in Scotland in 2003 gave walkers access to almost all land as long as they behaved
responsibly. See Lovett, supra note 103, at 777-78 (contrasting the Scottish legislation with the British
statute); What Is the Right to Roam?, RAMBLERS ASS’N, http://www.ramblers.org.uk/advice/pathsand-access/england/what-is-the-right-to-roam.aspx [https://perma.cc/F4UV-XZCS] (providing a
summary of right to roam laws in Scotland, England, and Wales).
128 Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000, c. 37, § 2 (Eng. & Wales).
129 SELECT COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTS, THIRTY-SECOND REPORT: THE RIGHT
OF ACCESS TO OPEN COUNTRYSIDE, 2006-7, HC 91, ¶ 11 (UK).
130 There are also two much smaller categories to which the right applies: “registered common
land”—i.e., land that was specifically designated as such by the Commons Registration Act 1965—and
“dedicated land”—i.e., land that was dedicated to the public by private owners as access land. Lovett,
supra note 103, at 781.
131 The Act also gave power to the Secretary of State for England and the National Assembly for
Wales to extend the right to coastal areas, conditioned on parliamentary approval. Acting on this power,
Parliament enacted the Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009, c. 23, §§ 296, 303 (Eng. & Wales).
132 Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000, c. 37, § 1(1)(a) (Eng. & Wales).
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mountain, moor, heath or down, and (b) is not registered common land.”133
The statutory definition excludes areas that were determined by the
appropriate countryside body to be “improved or semi-improved grassland.”134
The second category, mountain land, refers to mountains of 1968 feet (600
meters) or higher.135 The third category, “coastal land,” was added in 2009
with the enactment of the Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009 and extended
the right to roam to a “coastal margin”136 in order to form a trail of over 2700
miles along the English coast.137 Overall, the public right of access covers 3.4
million acres (between 8% and 12% of the total amount of land) in some of
the best hiking areas in England and Wales.138
The right to roam is subject to several limitations. First, the right does
not apply to freshwater bodies such as rivers, streams, and lakes. Second, it
excludes cultivated agricultural areas.139 Third, the Act specifically exempts
sports fields, such as golf courses, race courses, and aerodromes.140 Fourth,
the Act provides that the right does not extend to land “within 20 metres [(60
feet)] of a dwelling,” as well as parks and gardens, thereby creating a “privacy
zone” for landowners in the ground adjacent to their homes.141 Fifth, the right
to roam in England and Wales permits only access on foot for recreational
purposes.142 Other recreational activities such as cycling, horseback riding,
camping, hunting, boating, bathing, or even lighting campfires are forbidden.143
In addition, hikers are required to avoid causing property damage and to
respect walls, gates, and fences.144 They are also expected to protect plants
and animals.145

Id. § 1(2).
Id.
Id.
Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009, c. 23, §§ 296, 303 (Eng. & Wales). The process by
which the exact location of the coastal margin is to be determined is expected to take years. For this
reason, we could not include it in our study.
137 See KATY OXFORD, NAT’L ASSEMBLY FOR WALES RESEARCH SERV., COUNTRYSIDE
ACCESS IN THE UK: A REVIEW OF ASSOCIATED LEGISLATION AND POLICY § 3.3.5 (2014)
(describing the England Coast Path as “the longest of the National Trails in England at 4,400 km”).
138 See The Ramblers Ass’n, The “Right to Roam” in England and Wales 1 (2007),
http://www.ramblers.org.uk/~/media/Files/Go%20walking/AccessFactSheet-FS8 [https://perma.cc
/KA2S-9HPB] (describing the 3.4 million acres to which the law applies as “some of England’s best
walking areas”).
139 Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000, c. 37, sch. 1, pt. 1, para. 1 (Eng. & Wales).
140 Id. at sch. 1, pt. 1, para. 7.
141 Id. at sch. 1, pt. 1, paras. 3–4.
142 See id. at sch. 2, para. 1(a) (providing that the Act does not entitle a person to be on land if
he is driving or riding a vehicle).
143 See id. at sch. 2, para. 1.
144 See id.
145 Id. at sch. 2, paras. 1(f), 1(l).
133
134
135
136
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Landowners, for their part, are obliged to give the public free access to
their properties if they are subject to the right to roam. In keeping with this
obligation, owners must ensure that all rights of way on their properties are
clear and must not post or maintain any misleading notices on, near, or on
the way to access land.146 Private landowners may restrict or bar access
altogether for up to twenty-eight days a year for any reason.147 However, any
restriction in excess of that period must be justified and requires special
approval from the authorities, which may be granted for reasons of land
management, conservation, or fire prevention.148
Under the Act, landowners are exempt from tort liability for harm to
hikers caused by natural features of the property or resulting from an
improper use of gates, fences, or walls.149 However, landowners are liable for
harms resulting from the materialization of risks they have intentionally or
recklessly created.150 For example, if an owner releases her cattle to graze on
the property and one cow attacks a visitor, the owner would be held liable for
the injury sustained by the visitor.
It may surprise American readers, but the scope of the right to roam in
England and Wales is modest relative to the scope of the right in other
countries. In Scotland, the right to roam, as established by the Land Reform
(Scotland) Act 2003 (LRSA), covers almost the entire territory of the country.151
Furthermore, Scottish law contains fewer exclusions and exemptions. For
example, in Scotland, the right to roam also applies to grassy sports fields
when they are not in active use.152 More significantly, the range of activities
permitted under Scottish law is much broader than the range permitted in
England and Wales. The definition of the right to roam in Scotland
encompasses such activities as organized educational tours,153 orienteering,
bicycle riding, rock climbing, swimming, and camping.154 Finally, Scottish law
does not demarcate a clear “privacy zone” for landowners (as the English law
does). Instead, it employs a reasonableness standard, requiring hikers to
provide owners with a reasonable measure of privacy and refrain from

Id. § 14(1).
Id. § 22(1)–(4).
Id. §§ 24–26.
Id. § 13(2).
Id.
See Lovett, supra note 103, at 777-78 (comparing LRSA coverage of “almost all land and in-land
water in Scotland” to the small percentage of English land covered by Countryside and Rights of
Way Act).
152 Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003, (ASP 2) § 7(7)(a)–(b).
153 See id. § 1(3)(b) (specifying that the access rights created by the Act may be exercised for
the purposes of carrying on a “relevant educational activity”).
154 See Lovett, supra note 103, at 787 (describing the extensive activities permitted under the LRSA).
146
147
148
149
150
151
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unreasonably disturbing them.155 This means that in Scotland, private
landowners can exclude visitors only to the extent necessary to give them a
reasonable degree of privacy in their homes. The conscious decision by the
Scottish legislature to avoid bright-line rules in designing the right to roam
and to build the statutory scheme on the standard of “reasonable access”
created uncertainty as to the precise scope of the right and has necessitated
judicial intervention in some cases.156
Some Scandinavian countries went even further than Scotland in
recognizing public roaming rights. In Scandinavia, the right to roam has
ancient historic roots and is widely known as “everyman’s right.”157 In Norway,
for example, the right to roam encompasses recreational activities such as
swimming, sailing, canoeing, and rowing.158 Hikers are allowed, in principle,
to pick up berries, flowers, and mushrooms for in situ consumption.159
Moreover, the right to roam grants the public the right to pitch tents and
camp for up to two days without seeking permission from the owner, as long
as tents are positioned at least 500 feet away from the nearest house and the
privacy of landowners is respected.160 Campers are allowed to light campfires
between mid-April and mid-September.161 As far as their duties are
concerned, in residential areas, hikers must keep a distance of 500 feet from
houses and other structures.162 Visitors must also refrain from littering,
causing property damage, and disturbing farm animals and wildlife.163
Moreover, the right to roam does not cover freshwater fishing.164
The success of the right to roam in Europe has prompted calls to
implement a similar arrangement in the United States. However, no one, so
far, has paused to ask the important question: what would be the effect of
doing so on property values? In the next Part, we set out to fill this void, in

Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003, (ASP 2) § 6(1)(b)(iv).
See Lovett, supra note 103, at 790 (noting that it is “not surprising” that the courts were left
to “draw . . . boundaries that the Scottish Parliament declined to draw”).
157 See, e.g., Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U. TORONTO L.J. 275,
298-99 (2008) (discussing the Scandinavian principle of Allemansratt); Barbro Plogander,
Modernizing Everyman’s Right to Roam in Sweden, EPOCH TIMES (Aug. 9, 2012), http://printarchive.
epochtimes.com/a1/en/us/nyc/2012/08-Aug/09/A04_EET20120809-NY-US.pdf [https://perma.cc/3
X4M-PM2Z] (describing the Swedish “everyman’s right” as the “right to public access to the
wilderness [that] dates back centuries”); see also Freedom to Roam, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Freedom_to_roam#In_the_Nordic_countries [https://perma.cc/RYA9-TGMP] (last updated
Feb. 4, 2017).
158 NORWEGIAN ENV’T AGENCY, M-86, RIGHT TO ROAM 2 (2013).
159 Id.
160 Id. at 6.
161 Id. at 3.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 3, 14.
164 Id. at 10.
155
156
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the hope of introducing an empirical dimension into the scholarly debates
about the right to roam and the right to exclude.
III. THE EFFECT OF THE RIGHT TO ROAM ON HOUSING PRICES
Laws serve as amenities that affect the enjoyment of one’s property. As
such, it is possible to estimate the value that individuals place on a law by
examining how property prices change when a law is passed. This approach
to estimating the value of a law is advocated by Anup Malani, who suggests
that changes in real estate value provide a relatively direct proxy for
individual utility (which is, of course, not directly measurable).165
In the context of the right to roam, property owners and interested buyers
implicitly calculate the net effect of increased access to natural features
provided by the right plus any loss they expect to incur from having to let
others cross their land. If buyers and owners believe the value of increased
access outweighs the lost value arising from the abridgement of their
exclusion right, real estate prices will increase, all other things being equal.
If, instead, the loss exceeds the gain, real estate prices will decline (again, all
other things being equal).
A. Research Design
To examine these hypotheses econometrically, it is necessary to examine
the change in property values after the right to roam law is passed relative to
the preexisting baseline. This before/after element of the research design
accounts for any constant underlying heterogeneity in property values that
may otherwise obscure the effect of any law change. For example, it is perhaps
the case that properties near hiking trails are generally more valuable than
those that lie far from such trails. If the right to roam law affects such lands
disproportionately, and this preexisting premium is not accounted for, it may
appear as though the right to roam law is associated with higher property
values when, in fact, it is hiking trails that create the price premium.
Likewise, it is important to be able to compare the values of properties
that are differentially exposed to the right to roam law (e.g., compare
properties where the law is in effect with properties in a jurisdiction where
the law is not in effect). This treatment/control element of the research design
is meant to account for any background trend in home values that is unrelated
to the passage of the law. Failure to account for this would have the potential
to confound the effect of the law with other changes in property values. For
165 See generally Anup Malani, Valuing Laws as Local Amenities, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1273 (2008)
(proposing a method for evaluating laws based on the extent to which they raise housing prices or
the value of residential land).
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example, if property values are going up over time everywhere (and, to cause
maximum econometric heartache, are doing so in a way that is not easily
captured by a simple trend variable), it might appear as though the right to
roam law is associated with an increase in property values when, actually, the
values would have risen even in the absence of the passage of the law.
Including the control group observations (for which the law change is not
occurring) allows the researcher to net out these comparable background
trends, as long as treatment and control groups are trending in a parallel
fashion. In principle, such a design will allow us to isolate the effect of the
passage of the right to roam law on real estate prices independent of any
preexisting heterogeneity in housing prices and any background trends.
In practice, however, things can go awry. First, there is often no data
spanning the before and after periods. For example, although we would like
to study the effects of Scotland’s more comprehensive right to roam statute,
the public real estate price data for Scotland are extremely limited prior to
the law’s adoption in 2003. Second, for the control observations to adequately
control for background trends, the control group must actually provide a
reasonable counterfactual trend for the treatment observations. If it does not,
its inclusion could fail to prevent a background trend from confounding the
estimation of the law’s effect, and it could actually make the estimate even
worse than if no control group had been used at all.166
Given these complications, we take the following approach. First, we
focus on property values in England and Wales since both countries have
comprehensive real estate price data for the 1995–2014 period, which spans
the law change that took place in 2000 for those countries. Second, rather
than compare the prices in these countries to prices in some other country
where no right to roam law was passed during the period, we instead compare
properties within the countries by region, exploiting the fact that some
regions of each country have a relatively large fraction of land that is affected
by the law, while other regions are largely unaffected by the law because they
lack the natural features specified in the law. By examining this comparison
between regions of one country, as opposed to looking at the differences
across countries, we ensure that any other changes occurring at the national
level (e.g., other law changes, macroeconomic effects, banking or creditor
policy changes, etc.) that may lead to different background trends in real
estate prices are adequately accounted for.

166 For a more in-depth discussion of these issues, see Jonah B. Gelbach & Jonathan Klick,
Empirical Law and Economics, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (Francesco
Parisi ed., forthcoming 2017), especially section III.B.
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Our difference-in-difference estimation strategy takes the following form

where the outcome variable (prt) is the average sales price167 sold in the region
r for the given time period (month t). We examine the natural log of the
average sales price.168 The data are available for each month from 1995 to 2014,
so we have 240 observations for each region in our dataset. The treatment
variable takes the value of zero for every period prior to December 2000,
when the law passed. In subsequent periods, the value is the fraction of total
land area in the region that is ultimately designated as access land.169 The
regression includes separate fixed effects for each region of the country being
studied170 (which allows for different baseline prices across the country), as
well as separate time fixed effects for each period171 (which allows for a
common background trend that could potentially be nonlinear) included in
the dataset. In some specifications, we account for the possibility that
different regions have differential preexisting trends by including a set of
terms where the region’s fixed effects are interacted with a linear time trend.172
This allows us to detrend the data differentially by region while running the
regression above.

167 The results that follow are largely unaffected if we instead focus on the price index available
in the dataset, which is based on properties that have been sold multiple times in the dataset to
account for changes such as size and style, etc., in the type of house. See GOV.UK, ABOUT THE UK
HOUSE PRICE INDEX (2016), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/about-the-uk-houseprice-index/about-the-uk-house-price-index [https://perma.cc/Y3AK-SYJC] (discussing how matched
pairs of transactions are used in a repeat sales regression procedure to develop the index so that
price trajectories can be estimated independently of any change in the housing mix that generates
the sales for a given month).
168 Focusing on the natural logarithm is helpful because it allows us to interpret the coefficients
as percentage changes. See JAMES H. STOCK & MARK W. WATSON, INTRODUCTION TO
ECONOMETRICS 271 (2d ed. 2007).
169 More explicitly, our treatment variable is the interaction between landfractionr, which is
always equal to the fraction of land designated as access land in the particular region (i.e., it does
not differ period to period), and lawt, which is the same for every region, but differs across the time
periods (i.e., it is 0 for periods prior to December 2000, and it is equal to 1 for periods from
December 2000 through the end of the sample period).
170 This is represented in the equation by the summation of ηr terms. Effectively, this allows
for each region to have its own differential baseline or intercept term in the regression. This regional
baseline is constant throughout the sample timespan.
171 This is represented in the equation by the summation of τt terms. This allows each period
to have its own differential baseline or intercept term in the regression. This time period baseline is
constant across all regions for the given time period.
172 Mechanically, this involves adding a separate additional variable to the regression for each
region where the variable is equal to a linear count (i.e., 1, 2, 3, . . . , T) for the given region, and
adding zero for the other regions.
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To further limit the possibility that other background factors are driving
real estate prices during our sample period, in addition to examining the
entire period 1995–2014, we also separately analyze substantially shorter time
windows to provide confidence that any price change we observe after the law
was passed is, in fact, due to the passage of the right to roam law and not
other things that may be changing in England and Wales. Focusing on short
time windows has the advantage of narrowing the possibility that other
changes relevant to real estate prices are occurring after the enactment of the
right to roam law. However, it also requires that owners and potential buyers
capitalize their views regarding the right to roam quickly. If it takes too much
time for the process to occur, short windows might miss some (or all) of the
resulting price evolution. Additionally, the expectations of what costs and
benefits the right to roam will bring may depart substantially from what
owners and potential buyers ultimately experience once the law is in effect.
For these reasons, we examine a number of different time periods, including
both short and long windows around the statute’s passage in 2000.
We focus on the passage of the law in 2000, rather than its subsequent
implementation, for two reasons. First, presumably, if owners and potential
buyers are rational, they will incorporate their expectations about the law
when it becomes clear that it will come into effect. Waiting until the law is
actually implemented to revise price expectations presumably creates arbitrage
opportunities for other actors in the market. Second, econometrically, since the
actual access land designations were made well after 2000, focusing on the
passage date helps mitigate a potential endogeneity problem. That is, if public
officials ultimately end up making access land designations on the basis of
expected changes in real estate values, it would be the case that our treatment
metric is actually influenced by our outcome variable, leading to a reverse
causation problem. Such determinations could either occur directly, with public
officials favoring higher/lower value areas for common access designation, or
they could occur indirectly, with higher/lower (though likely higher) value land
owners lobbying officials more vigorously during the designation period. By
focusing on price changes as of 2000, when the actual ultimate determinations
are unknown and actors in the real estate market are only basing their
expectations on the (pre)existence of the natural features designated in the
statute, this kind of reverse causality problem is less likely to influence our results.
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B. Data

The real estate data come from the United Kingdom’s Land Registry
House Price Index webpage.173 These data include all residential housing
transactions in England and Wales, whether done by cash or with the use of
a mortgage.174 The relevant geographic units in England are regions, while in
Wales, they are counties and authorities. This difference was necessitated by
the geographic units for which the access land measurements were available.
Thus, for England, we have average house sales price data by month for the
following nine regions: North East, North West, York and Humberside, West
Midlands, East Midlands, East of England, London, South West, and South
East. For Wales, we have monthly average house sales price data for the
following twenty-two counties and authorities: Blaenau Gwent, Bridgend,
Caerphilly, Cardiff, Carmarthenshire, Ceredigion, Conwy, Denbighshire,
Flintshire, Gwynedd, Isle of Anglesey, Merthyr Tydfil, Monmouthshire,
Neath Port Talbot, Newport, Pembrokeshire, Powys, Rhondda Cynon Taff,
Swansea, The Vale of Glamorgan, Torfaen, and Wrexham.
The fraction of land covered by the law is measured as the total land area
affected divided by the total land area in the geographic unit. For England,
the data were provided to us by the Open Access Contact Centre at Natural
England. These data are reproduced in Table 1 below.
Table 1: Access Land in England
Region
London
East of England
West Midlands
East Midlands
South East
South West
York & Humberside
North West
North East
TOTAL

Total Area (ha)

Access Land (ha)

Percent

159,471.80
1,957,409.90
1,300,380.50
1,581,076.00
1,940,740.50
2,436,589.10
1,556,402.80
1,492,361.60
867,642.20
13,292,074.40

831
14,463.20
18,852.40
33,182.40
49,599.00
108,933.30
215,308.40
264,112.40
159,968.10
865,250.20

0.5
0.7
1.4
2.1
2.6
4.5
13.8
17.7
18.4
6.5

173 UK House Price Index, LAND REGISTRY, http://landregistry.data.gov.uk/app/ukhpi [https://
perma.cc/PN7U-C9QE].
174 The documentation for the data is available at GOV.UK, supra note 167.
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For Wales, the data are available publicly on the internet.175 The data are
reproduced in Table 2 below.
Table 2: Access Land in Wales
County/Authority Name
Cardiff
Monmouthshire
Pembrokeshire
Isle of Anglesey
The Vale of Glamorgan
Carmarthenshire
Flintshire
Newport
Neath Port Talbot
Gwynedd
Wrexham
Conwy
Caerphilly
Ceredigion
Denbighshire
Rhondda Cynon Taff
Swansea
Bridgend
Powys
Merthyr Tydfil
Torfaen
Blaenau Gwent
TOTAL

Total Area (ha)

Access Land (ha)

Percent

14,948
73,669
101,238
74,891
33,977
223,589
48,949
21,835
45,193
91,290
50,377
72,568
27,758
181,244
84,630
37,134
42,123
25,522
430,330
8,674
12,475
10,540
1,712, 954

110
515
936
1,507
517
7,803
1,327
978
3,483
9,189
5,105
8,288
4,022
25,695
12,182
5,304
6,015
4,213
88,073
2,178
3,261
4,193
194,894

1
1
1
2
2
3
3
4
8
10
10
11
14
14
14
14
14
17
20
25
26
40
11

175 Open Access Mapping Review Statistics (Sept. 2014), http://naturalresources.wales/media/
677725/open-access-mapping-review-stats-external.xls [https://perma.cc/93QU-5MHA].
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C. Empirical Analysis – England

In our first regressions, shown in Table 3, we use all of the data from 1995–
2014, following the specifications indicated above.
Table 3: Effect of the Passage of the 2000 Right to Roam Statute – England
1995–2014
(Standard Errors Clustered by Region in Parentheses) 176
ln(Average Sales Price)
Treatment Effect
Regional Fixed Effects
Time Period Fixed Effects
Region Specific Trends
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10

-0.92
(0.24)***
Yes
Yes
No

-0.55
(0.14)***
Yes
Yes
Yes

The effect of the treatment variable is negative, and it is statistically
significant. This is true even if we include differential trends across regions
in the regressions. The latter specification provides some confidence that the
estimated treatment effect is not simply a continuation of a preexisting trend
leading to a spurious correlation. The coefficients across the two specifications
are not statistically significantly different from each other.177

176 Clustering the standard errors by region allows for potential serial correlation in the
housing prices within a region. This technique is useful because period to period observations are
unlikely to be independent, with the price series exhibiting a kind of inertia. It could also be the
case that there is some dependence across regions within a given period. To account for this
possibility, in unreported results, we also calculated standard errors clustered by region and period
using the method described in A. Colin Cameron, Jonah B. Gelbach & Douglas L. Miller, Robust
Inference with Multiway Clustering, 29 J. BUS. & ECON. STAT. 238 (2011). Using this method, our
results are substantially the same. In no instance does the determination of statistical significance
vary based on which way the standard errors are clustered. Another paper raises the concern that
parametric inference techniques are faulty when the number of clusters is small. See A. Colin
Cameron, Jonah B. Gelbach & Douglas L. Miller, Bootstrap-Based Improvements for Inference with
Clustered Errors, 90 REV. ECON. & STAT. 414 (2008). In our case, we have only nine regions, which
would trigger their concern. If we apply Cameron et al.’s wild cluster bootstrap technique, we
continue to find that we reject the null of zero price change at a type 1 error of 1%.
177 Estimating the two regressions as a system of equations and then testing the equality of the
treatment effect coefficients leads to a p value that exceeds 0.22.
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To contextualize our results, it is useful to compare the estimated relative
price decline across regions, based on how much of the land in the region is
declared to be access land. As a baseline comparison, our data indicate that
between 2000 and 2014, the average property across all of England increased
in value by about 113%. This comparison is provided in Figure 1.
Figure 1

The average loss, as a fraction of the average price appreciation over the 2000–
2014 period, is about 6%, with London and the East of England effectively
experiencing no loss, and the North East experiencing a loss of about 14% of
the period’s gain. The effects are slightly smaller when the differential trends
are accounted for, as seen in Figure 2.
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Figure 2

To further examine whether the estimated effect is causal, Table 4
considers whether the estimated effect is merely an artifact picking up a
departure between the trends in rural housing prices and those of urban
prices. To account for this, a variable capturing the fraction of regional
residents who live in rural areas in the post-law change period is included.178
If the access land designations are simply capturing changes in rural home
prices in the post-2000 period, the inclusion of this variable should be able to
sort the two effects.

178 Mechanically, this variable is constructed in the same fashion as our treatment effect
variable (i.e., 0 for all observations pre–December 2000; for all observations from December 2000
and on, the variable is equal to the rural population variable in the given region). The underlying
data are derived from a report issued by the UK Office of National Statistics. See Rural and Urban
Areas: Comparing Lives Using Rural/Urban Classifications fig.5, UK OFF. NAT’L STAT., http://www.
ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/regional-trends/regional-trends/no--43--2011-edition/rural-and-urban-areas--compa
ring-lives-using-rural-urban-classifications---supporting-data.xls [https://perma.cc/24W5-VU46].

954

[Vol. 165: 917

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

Table 4: Effect of the Passage of the 2000 Right to Roam Statute – England
1995–2014
(Standard Errors Clustered by Region in Parentheses)
ln(Average Sales Price)
Treatment Effect
Rural Population
Share x Law Period
Regional Fixed Effects
Time Period Fixed Effects
Region Specific Trends
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10

-0.96
(0.25)***
-0.002
(0.003)
Yes
Yes
No

-0.45
(0.06)***
0.004
(0.001)***
Yes
Yes
Yes

To further isolate causality, in Table 5, we examine a number of smaller
time windows. We start with a very narrow window, namely 1999–2001, which
involves only a full calendar year of data before and after the legal change in
December 2000. We also present periods from 1995 through 2001 and 1995
through 2005. Finally, we present an estimate that stops the sample at the end
of 2006, out of concern that the worldwide real estate slump beginning in
2007 might be affecting our results in unexpected ways. Because these shorter
windows leave insufficient time to credibly estimate region-specific trends,
we only present the specifications without those trends.
Table 5: Effect of the Passage of the 2000 Right to Roam Statute – England
Varying Time Windows
(Standard Errors Clustered by Region in Parentheses)

1999–2001
Treatment Effect

-0.61
(0.11)***
-0.00
(0.00)

Rural Population
Share x Law Period
Regional Fixed
Yes
Effects
Time Period Fixed
Yes
Effects
Region Specific
No
Trends
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10

ln(Average Sales Price)
1995–2001 1995–2005

1995–2006

-1.68
(0.30)***
-0.00
(0.00)

-1.13
(0.20)***
0.00
(0.00)

-0.96
(0.18)***
0.00
(0.00)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No
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In all of the shorter windows, we continue to find a negative treatment effect
that is statistically significant, though there is some variability in the estimate
of the treatment effect.
We also attempt to account for the fact that the London property market
is essentially a world market, which might make it inappropriate to include
the London observations in the sample. We present these results, where the
London observations are excluded, in Table 6.
Table 6: Effect of the Passage of the 2000 Right to Roam Statute – England
London Omitted
(Standard Errors Clustered by Region in Parentheses)
ln(Average Sales Price)
Treatment Effect
Rural Population
Share x Law Period
Regional Fixed Effects
Time Period Fixed Effects
Region Specific Trends
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10

-0.40
(0.21)*
0.01
(0.00)**
Yes
Yes
No

-0.43
(0.08)***
0.00
(0.00)***
Yes
Yes
Yes

The results that omit London are largely in line with the previous results.
Thus, it seems unlikely that London is driving our results.
Lastly, to examine whether the effect we have observed is stable, as
opposed to, perhaps, diminishing over time (as might be the case, for
example, if people’s values change when the law is announced due to
uncertainty regarding how it will be carried out, only to revert to baseline
after an adjustment period), we break the treatment effect into two separate
indicators. In the first case, we simply split the post-adoption indicator into
two equal spans (December 2000–December 2007 and January 2008–
December 2014). In the second case, we split the indicator into the period in
which the law was passed but not yet fully implemented (December 2000–
October 2005) and the period in which the law was implemented (November
2005–December 2014). If the price effect is undone in the later period, we
should expect to find a zero (or even positive) coefficient for the later
treatment effect, whereas if the price effect largely endures, we should expect
negative coefficients on both indicators.
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Table 7: Effect of the Passage of the 2000 Right to Roam Statute – England
Evolving Effects
(Standard Errors Clustered by Region in Parentheses)

Early Period
Later Period

ln(Average Sales Price)
Dec. 2000–Oct. 2005
Dec. 2000–Dec. 2007
Jan. 2008–Dec. 2014
Nov. 2005–Dec. 2014

Early Period
-0.91
Treatment Effect
(0.17)***
Later Period
-1.01
Treatment Effect
(0.35)***
Rural Population
-0.00
Share x Law Period
(0.00)
Yes
Regional Fixed Effects
Time Period Fixed
Yes
Effects
No
Region Specific Trends
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10

-1.21
(0.19)***
-0.83
(0.29)***
-0.00
(0.00)
Yes
Yes
No

Breaking the treatment effect into early and late components largely suggests
that the effect endures over time, as opposed to individuals becoming used to
the effects of the legal change.
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D. Empirical Analysis – Wales

As indicated in Tables 1 and 2 above, England and Wales appear to have
made very different choices regarding access land, with Wales designating
almost twice as much land (proportionately) as access land. Since we have the
treatment variable at a much finer geographic level for Wales, Wales gives us
the opportunity to isolate the right to roam effect much more precisely. For
these reasons, we analyze Wales separately from England in Table 8, following
the same approach as above.
Table 8: Effect of the Passage of the 2000 Right to Roam Statute – Wales
1995–2014
(Standard Errors Clustered by Region in Parentheses)
ln(Average Sales Price)
Treatment Effect
Regional Fixed Effects
Time Period Fixed Effects
Region Specific Trends
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10

-0.51
(0.12)***
Yes
Yes
No

-0.48
(0.10)***
Yes
Yes
Yes

As with England, we find statistically significant negative treatment effects,
regardless of whether we account for differential regional trends. The
difference between the two coefficients is not statistically significant.179
In terms of gauging the magnitude of the estimated effect, as above, it
may be useful to compare the losses to the baseline gain in property prices
over the 2000–2014 period. For Wales, the average appreciation of property
values over this period is 112%. As can be seen in Figure 3, the magnitude of
the loss in property values as a share of overall appreciation in the 2000–2014
period is quite similar to that of England.180

Estimating the two equations as a system yields a difference in coefficients with a p value > 0.71.
There is virtually no difference between the regional trend and no regional trend
specifications; therefore, we only present magnitudes based on the no trends model for Wales.
179
180
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Figure 3

The average magnitude across the regions of Wales is -0.05, whereas the
maximum loss exceeds 16% of the overall appreciation in the period. The
Welsh results, then, would seem to further bolster the English results, both
in terms of direction of the effect and its practical magnitude.
As with England, there is a potential concern that we are merely picking
up some differential change in rural land prices. As above, we present results
where we control for this effect by having a parallel December 2000–onward
effect that controls for the percent of the region’s population living in a rural
area.181

181 These data come from a statistical bulletin issued by the Welsh government. See Statistical
Directorate, Welsh Assembly Government, “Rural Wales”—Definitions and How to Choose
Between Them tbl.1 (2008), http://gov.wales/docs/statistics/2008/080313sb102008en.pdf [https://
perma.cc/TB7F-5L77]. The rural indicator is calculated by subtracting the sum of the percent of each
region’s population living in large and small towns in the “less sparse context” from 100%.
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Table 9: Effect of the Passage of the 2000 Right to Roam Statute – Wales
1995–2004
(Standard Errors Clustered by Region in Parentheses)
ln(Average Sales Price)
Treatment Effect
Rural Population Share x
Law Period
Regional Fixed Effects
Time Period Fixed Effects
Region Specific Trends
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10

-0.37
(0.09)***
0.20
(0.03)***
Yes
Yes
No

-0.43
(0.10)***
0.07
(0.03)**
Yes
Yes
Yes

As we saw with England, controlling for a parallel change having to do with
rural areas in the period after the roaming law is passed does not affect our
estimate of the treatment effect of the law.
Table 10 examines shorter windows around the legal change, following the
conventions described above.
Table 10: Effect of the Passage of the 2000 Right to Roam Statute – Wales
Varying Time Windows
(Standard Errors Clustered by Region in Parentheses)

1999–2001
-0.28
(0.05)***

Treatment
Effect
Rural Population
0.05
Share x Law
(0.02)***
Period
Regional Fixed
Yes
Effects
Time Period
Yes
Fixed Effects
Region Specific
No
Trends
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10

ln(Average Sales Price)
1995–2001 1995–2005
-0.48
-0.51
(0.11)***
(0.11)***

1995–2006
-0.46
(0.10)***

0.08
(0.04)**

0.14
(0.03)***

0.15
(0.03)***

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

As before, regardless of the window examined, the estimated effect is robust
and largely focused in the very short window surrounding the legal change.
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The coincidence of this timing provides some confidence that it is indeed the
law change that is driving our result.
To examine the possibility that the initial effect of the law change is
subsequently undone, we again examine the treatment effect divided across
two periods as described above. These results are presented in Table 11.
Table 11: Effect of the Passage of the 2000 Right to Roam Statute – Wales
Evolving Effects
(Standard Errors Clustered by Region in Parentheses)
ln(Average Sales Price)
Dec. 2000–Dec. 2007
Dec. 2000–Oct. 2005
Jan. 2008–Dec. 2014
Nov. 2005–Dec. 2014
-0.39
-0.48
(0.11)***
(0.13)***
-0.35
-0.31
(0.08)***
(0.08)***
0.20
0.20
(0.03)***
(0.03)***

Early Period
Later Period
Early Period
Treatment Effect
Later Period
Treatment Effect
Rural Population
Share x Law Period
Regional Fixed
Effects
Time Period Fixed
Effects
Region Specific
Trends
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

As we found with England, the early effect of the law is comparable to the later
effect of the law. Thus, there is no evidence that the price effects unwind, even
in the fairly long term. Instead, it seems that the estimated effects endure.
As with England, the results for Wales suggest that the passage of the
right to roam statute in 2000 led to substantial declines in real estate prices
in those counties and municipal authorities where a relatively large fraction
of the land area was designated as access land. The fact that most of the
change occurred quickly after the passage of the statute enhances our
confidence that the identified relationship can be interpreted causally.
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E. Policy Implications
Our findings have important policy implications concerning the right to
exclude and the right to roam. First, consider the right to exclude. Our study
shows that the right to exclude is very valuable to property owners, and even
so-called slight intrusions on owners’ exclusion right in favor of more public
access seem to come at a real cost to owners. In this regard, testing the impact
of the right to roam on property value is particularly interesting, because the
right to roam, as it is designed in England and Wales, only minimally
interferes with owners’ use of their land. Hence, our findings suggest that the
right to exclude is of independent value to property owners; it is not a mere
proxy for use rights, as some property theorists suggest.182
It bears emphasis that in the United States, private property rights are
constitutionally protected against government takings. The Takings Clause of
the Fifth Amendment provides that the government can take private property
only for a public use and only in exchange for the payment of just
compensation. No similar protection exists in European countries. As a result,
European countries that adopted a right to roam were not obligated to pay
compensation to affected property owners.183 In light of the Takings Clause,
establishment of a right to roam in the United States would likely be
different. Enactment of a right to roam falls under the category of regulation;
it does not involve physical seizure of private plots. As a general rule, regulation
of property is a legitimate exercise of government power that does not entail
the payment of compensation. However, if the regulation “goes too far[,] it will
be recognized as a taking” for which compensation must be paid.184
Of particular relevance to our study are two important Supreme Court
cases. In the first, Kaiser Aetna v. United States, the Court ruled that the
establishment of a navigation easement over a private body of water in Hawaii
constituted a taking that required the payment of compensation.185 In this
case, the owner of a private pond converted it to a bay and connected it to a
navigable marina.186 The government claimed that as a result of the acts of the

182 See, e.g., Katz, supra note 157, at 290 (suggesting that the essence of ownership lies in the
ability “to set the agenda for a resource” and that the right to exclude is important only insofar as it
enables owners to decide how to use their property).
183 The Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000, c. 37 (Eng. & Wales), is representative of
this reality, as it is silent with respect to any compensation payable to land owners for the diminution
in value of their private property. While the United Kingdom has a system of compulsory purchase
orders that require compensation, such orders are warranted only in the event of a direct acquisition
of private property through the exercise of eminent domain powers, and not when governmental
measures result in depreciation of the private owner’s land value.
184 Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
185 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
186 Id. at 166.
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owner, the private lagoon had become “a navigable water of the United States”
and was therefore subject to public access.187 Rejecting the government’s
position, the Supreme Court held that “the [g]overnment’s attempt to create
a public right of access to the improved pond goes so far beyond ordinary
regulation or improvement for navigation as to amount to a taking.”188
The second case is Nollan v. California Coastal Commission.189 There, the
owners of a beachfront property requested a permit from the California Coastal
Commission to replace a bungalow that stood on their lot with a larger house.190
The Commission conditioned the grant of the permit on the owners’ agreement
to give the public a right of access across their lot, which was situated between
two public beaches.191 The Supreme Court held that the condition imposed
by the government in this case was unconstitutional.192 En route to this
conclusion, the Court explained that “[h]ad California simply required the
Nollans to make an easement across their beachfront available to the public
on a permanent basis in order to increase public access to the beach, . . . we
have no doubt there would have been a taking.”193 The Court further noted
that the establishment of an easement constitutes a taking as it amounts to a
permanent physical occupation.194 The Court opined that a permanent
physical occupation occurs “where individuals are given a permanent and
continuous right to pass to and fro, so that the real property may continuously
be traversed, even though no particular individual is permitted to station
himself permanently upon the premises.”195
Hence, under current takings jurisprudence, legislation that creates a
public right to roam is likely to be upheld as constitutional only if the
government pays compensation to all private property owners whose land will
be affected.196 Our results provide an estimate of the amount the government
would have to pay private property owners should it decide to grant roaming
privileges to the public. While, for the reasons we elaborate below, we cannot
calculate the total compensation amount with pinpoint accuracy, our results
constitute a useful benchmark for policymakers.
Id. at 170.
Id. at 178.
483 U.S. 825 (1987).
Id. at 828.
Id.
Id. at 841-42.
Id. at 831.
Id. at 832-33.
Id. at 832.
See Jess Kyle, Of Constitutions and Cultures: The British Right to Roam and American Property
Law, 44 E NVTL. L. REP. 10,898, 10,902 (2014) (observing that “[g]iven the Court’s association of
a public right-of-way in Nollan with a permanent physical occupation, prospects for an American
right to not simply ‘pass through’ but ‘roam around’ do seem grim”).
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
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It is important to understand that our findings go well beyond the debate
about the right to roam and the takings question. The price effects we report
have general welfare implications. Our analysis suggests that even measures
that may seem to have only a trifling effect on the right to exclude can cause
a drop in property values. This effect must be taken into account whenever
the government considers land use policies that compromise owners’ right to
exclude.
We grant that there is a cultural dimension to the analysis. It is widely
believed that the right to exclude is more valuable to American property owners
than to their counterparts in European countries. Accordingly, there is reason
to believe the adoption of laws and policies that grant greater public access,
such as the right to roam, in the United States may have an even bigger negative
impact on real property prices than the one observed in England and Wales.
Ultimately, however, our study bears on the debate about whether to
recognize a right to roam in the United States. The results of our study
indicate that recognizing a right to roam has a significant negative effect on
real estate prices. This should sound a cautionary note to those who support
an institution of a right to roam in the United States. That said, our study
does not, and cannot, on its own, negate the possibility that the enactment of
a right to roam may be welfare-enhancing. It is theoretically possible that the
benefit to the public from instituting a right to roam would exceed the loss to
property owners. But, it is very difficult to estimate the benefit the public
derives from having the ability to roam. The benefits to hikers, for example,
are invariably diverse and largely immeasurable. Cultural and historical
factors likely play a critical role.197
Another important factor that must enter the discussion is the availability
of alternatives. The expansive state and federal parks that exist in the United
States provide ample opportunity for hikers and the public at large to engage
in recreational outdoor activities, even in the absence of a right to roam. Of
course, some will argue that the current state of affairs falls short of the gold
standard and that more public access is needed. In light of the existence of
the state and national parks in the United States, however, the marginal
benefit from expanding access by instituting roaming rights may be smaller
than the marginal benefit in the European scenario, while the marginal harm
may be greater.

197 Hypothetical-valuation studies have been widely used to value ecological amenities,
endangered species, etc., which might offer some hope of measuring benefits here. That said, there
is controversy about whether those measures are credible. See generally Jerry Hausman, Contingent
Valuation: From Dubious to Hopeless, 26 J. ECON. PERSP. 43 (2012) (surveying the literature on these
studies and concluding that they suffer from long-standing problems).
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A sensible compromise may therefore be to introduce a right to roam only
in certain areas that are highly attractive to the public and are not normally
designated as park land. The one example that immediately comes to mind is
beaches and lakeshores. Lawmakers have long struggled with the challenge of
public access to beaches and have employed various legal tools, such as the
public trust doctrine,198 custom,199 and even exactions,200 to expand the right
of the public to use beaches. Given the public interest in access to beaches, it
is possible that the recognition of limited roaming rights in such areas may
prove to be socially desirable.
Finally, the scope of the right to roam also affects the calculus. The more
expansive the roaming rights, the greater the negative effect on real estate
prices is likely to be. As we explained, the scope of the right to roam in
England and Wales is much more limited than in Scotland and Scandinavia.
In principle, it is possible to restrict the right to roam even more than
England and Wales did by placing additional time and place limitations on
the right. Specifically, a law could limit the public right of passage to certain
days (e.g., weekends) or seasons (e.g., summer) and allow access only to
certain areas on the fringes of the designated property. Such measures may
lower the impact of the right to roam on property prices. At the same time,
however, they would likely reduce the benefit to the public.
F. Empirical Limitations and Extensions
Although our finding of a decline in real estate prices coinciding with the
passage of the right to roam statute in 2000 is robust across England and
Wales as well as across various sample time series restrictions, it is possible
that the result we have identified is being driven by something other than the
statute’s passage. The most obvious possibility is that the designation of
access land was endogenous to land values. Although focusing on price
changes before the land was actually designated in each area mitigates this
concern, it does not eliminate it altogether. Actors in the real estate market
might have accurately predicted that public authorities would hesitate in
designating relatively valuable land (or land in relatively valuable regions).
To investigate this possibility, one could examine a more micro level of
analysis, perhaps exploiting the sixty-foot privacy zone included in the
statute. There are surely some properties that are smaller than sixty square
feet, which would be effectively exempt from the statute. These properties’
values could be used as an even more appropriate within-region control group

198
199
200

E.g., Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984).
E.g., State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671 (Or. 1969).
E.g., Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
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in either a matching design, a regression discontinuity design, or a triple
differences design. Any of these approaches could strengthen claims of
causality or credibly unveil the potential underlying endogeneity in our
present analysis.
A more fundamental critique of our study involves the use of property
values as a proxy for the value people assign to the law. If there are concerns
that markets do not properly capitalize these values into real estate prices,
either because the actors in the markets are less than rational or because the
markets are not thick enough for informational efficiency to hold, the present
project is doomed from the start. Even if those concerns are not founded, one
could still be concerned that values accruing to individuals not participating
directly in the real estate market are not sufficiently weighted in this kind of
approach. This would limit our ability to make any strong welfare claims
regarding the law itself, and it would provide only some of the inputs
necessary in making strong claims regarding the value of exclusion versus the
value of access.
CONCLUSION
The right to exclude is considered the touchstone of private property by
laypersons. For many centuries, legal scholars shared that view. In the last
several decades, however, the centrality of the right to exclude to the
institution of private property has been challenged, first by legal realists and
more recently by progressive property scholars. At present, the world of
property theory is engulfed in a heated debate between pro-exclusion and
anti-exclusion theorists. The debate is not merely conceptual; it has farreaching implications regarding the extent to which the government can take
liberties with private property to advance other social goals. For instance,
contemporary research suggests that the security of property is the key
determinant of the wealth of nations.201 Notwithstanding the vast scholarship
on the right to exclude, no one, until now, has tried to estimate the value of
the right to exclude to property owners and thereby provide an empirical
foundation for the debate.
In this Article, we set out to fill that empirical void by measuring, for the
first time, the value of the right to exclude to property owners. To this end,
we analyzed the effect of the legislation that recognized a right to roam in
England and Wales on property values by comparing affected and non-affected
parcels before and after the legislation. We found that the formalization of the
201 For a series of articles demonstrating that common law property systems lead to stronger capital
markets and overall economic growth, see Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON.
1113, 1116 (1998); Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131 (1997); Rafael
La Porta et al., The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 J. ECON. LITERATURE 285 (2008).
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right to roam, though only minimally invasive, led to a statistically significant
and substantively important drop in property values. There are reasons to
believe that if the United States were to institute a right to roam, the adverse
effect on property values would be much greater.
The results of our study have far-reaching implications not only for the
debate about the centrality of the right to exclude, but also for the burgeoning
debate in the property literature about the desirability of adopting a right to
roam, or more generally, expanding public access to private land. Our
findings adumbrate the potential cost that would befall private property
owners if their right to exclude were curtailed.
Let there be no mistake: we are under no illusion that our study will bring
either scholarly debate to a close. As we pointed out, it is essential to evaluate
the benefit that may arise from increasing public access to private property in
order to know the net social effect of laws and regulations that override the
right to exclude. Furthermore, we are fully aware of the fact that empirical
research cannot settle philosophical debates about the right and the good.
That said, our study provides much-needed and long-awaited information
about the value of the right to exclude that can shape land use policies in the
future. It also carries a promise for transforming the nature of academic debate
about private property from a purely theoretical discussion into one that is
more anchored in empirical research and findings. We believe it would be a
welcome transformation that would carry the world of property law forward.

